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The shadow banking sector is a sector that is comprised of financial intermediaries
that do not have access to central bank funds and performs their activities outside the
regular banking system. This sector had been rapidly growing in most developed
economies. This dissertation focuses on the behavioral difference and interaction of the
traditional and shadow banking sectors as displayed by the relative asset position of both
sectors, their risk-taking positions, and their business-cycles properties.
The first essay examines the impact of minimum capital requirements on the share
of shadow to total banking assets. Previous literature has argued that increased regulation
of the traditional banking sector will lead to regulatory arbitrage and an increase in shadow
banking activities. That is, banks shift their operation away from traditional banking into
the less regulated shadow banking sector when traditional banking activities are more
heavily regulated. This hypothesis is tested using data from 76 countries over the 2005
through 2010 period. The results provide some evidence in favor of the regulatory arbitrage
hypothesis, but only for high-income countries.
The second essay focuses on bank risk-taking behavior when the capital requirement is
strengthened. Risk is proxied by the share of non-performing loans to total loans in the
bank’s portfolio. Using cross-section data from 82 countries, it examines whether one

banking sector takes on more risks than the other sector when a specific risk-based capital
regulation is applied. The shadow banking sector is found to take on higher risks, as
displayed by the loan failures, than the traditional banking sector in response to enhanced
capital regulations.
The third essay uses the relationship between leverage and assets to quantify the
pro-cyclicality of leverage and evaluates the impact of Basel II implementation on procyclicality. Using panel data from 113 countries over the period of 2005-2012, procyclicality is examined for the shadow and traditional banking sectors. The key results
indicate that the traditional banking sector tends to be less pro-cyclical than the shadow
banking sector and that Basel II implementation intensifies the pro-cyclicality.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The shadow banking sector is a sector that is comprised of financial intermediaries
that do not have access to central bank funds and performs their activities outside the
regular banking system. This sector has been rapidly growing in most developed
economies. The emergence of the shadow banking sector has yielded both costs and
benefits (Claessens et al. 2012, Poszar et al. 2012). On the benefit side, shadow banks
reduce the cost of credit and provide a broader array of investment options and banking
services. The shadow banking sector provides substantial benefits to borrowers and to the
wider economy by increasing efficiency and by providing liquidity and funding. On the
costs side, the shadow banking sector is a source of systemic risk, which has a negative
impact on economic activity.
The Institute for International Finance (IIF, 2012) lists four benefits of the shadow
banking sector. It provides efficient financial services. As argued by Pozsar et al. (2010),
a second benefit of the shadow banking sector is driven by specialization and comparative
advantages over the traditional banking sector. The sector allows investors to reduce their
risks by spreading and diversifying their assets into several financial instruments and
enables them to borrow from various sources. A third benefit is that it offers flexibility and
more investment opportunities in addition to services from the traditional sector. Finally,
the sector provides more liquidity and funding for borrowers and other market participants.
Discussion of the shadow banking system highlights three possible costs; it
contributing toward systemic risk, regulatory arbitrage may takes place, and its
contribution toward pro-cyclicality of the financial sector (Financial Stability Board,
1

2011). Hence, the benefits of the shadow banking sector are accompanied by costs, i.e. the
risk associated with the shadow banking activities. The risks contribute toward systemic
risk when they are not managed effectively. For example, it has been argued that shadow
banking played a significant role in the recent global financial crisis. The potential systemic
risk is due to the interconnectedness of the shadow banking sector with the various sources
of funding including households, corporates, and financial institutions and with its
interactions with the traditional banking system. The shadow banking sector is
characterized by less regulation than the traditional sector. Minimum capital requirements
proposed by the Basel Accords are primarily directed toward the traditional banking sector,
therefore there is a concern over the possibility of regulatory arbitrage. Bank will find a
way to evade the regulations causing the regulations to induce the growth of shadow
banking activities. This arbitrage itself may be used by banks to increase their leverage.
Shadow banking sector activities concentrate on maturity, credit, and liquidity
transformation (Pozsar et al., 2010). Shadow banks use non-deposit instruments such as
money market funds and commercial papers to raise funds and transform them into longerterm assets. These activities can facilitate banks to achieve higher leverage. The higher
leverage may amplify the pro-cyclicality of banking activity, i.e. leverage is high during
booms and low during busts.
This dissertation examine the effect of banking regulation, specifically the minimum
capital requirements and Basel II recommended by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS). BCBS was established in response international financial market
disruptions that followed the collapse of the Bretton Wood managed exchange rate system
in 1973 as well as other financial disruptions. The breakdown of the system led to large
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foreign currency losses incurred by banks in many countries. The committee was
established at the end of 1974 by the central bank governance of G10 countries. Up to 2014
the membership of the committee has expanded and now consists of representatives of the
central banks and banking supervisory authorities from 28 jurisdictions and 3 observer
countries. The member countries and jurisdictions are Argentina, Australia, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, China, European Union, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India,
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and
United States. The country observers are Chile, Malaysia, and United Arab Emirates.
The goal of the committee is “to strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices
of banks worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability”. The committee
serves as a forum for cooperation of the members on banking supervision. It seeks to
achieve the goal by: 1) exchanging information on developments in the banking sector and
financial markets to help identify current or emerging risks for the global financial system;
2) sharing supervisory issues, approaches and techniques to promote common
understanding and to improve cross-border cooperation; 3) establishing and promoting
global standards for the regulation and supervision of banks as well as guidelines and sound
practices; 4) addressing regulatory and supervisory gaps that pose risks to financial
stability; 5) monitoring the implementation of BCBS standards in member countries and
beyond with the purpose of ensuring their timely, consistent and effective implementation
and contributing to a "level playing field" among internationally-active banks; 6)
consulting with central banks and bank supervisory authorities which are not members of
the BCBS to benefit from their input into the BCBS policy formulation process and to
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promote the implementation of BCBS standards, guidelines and sound practices beyond
BCBS member countries; and 7) coordinating and cooperating with other financial sector
standard setters and international bodies, particularly those involved in promoting financial
stability (Banks for International Settlements, 2013).
Capitalization of internationally active banks became the main focus of the
committee in the 1980s. In the mid-1980s there was a large increase in cross-border
banking activities (Petersen and Mukuddam-Petersen, 2014). Latin American debt crisis
also took place during this period. At the same time international banks have suffered the
deterioration of capital ratios. Another concern is that some international banks avoid
regulations by relocating to jurisdictions or countries that have less strict regulations.
Therefore, the issue of standardized capital is critical to maintaining global banking system
stability. In 1988 the first Basel Accord (Basel I) was introduced in an attempt to set or
harmonized bank capital regulation at the international level. This standards is designed to
establish a more stable banking system and lessen the discrepancy in bank competitiveness
across jurisdictions and across countries (Petersen and Mukuddam-Petersen, 2014).
The Basel Accords mostly deal with the effort to maintain a sufficient level of
capital. To determine the sufficient level of capital, Basel I adopted a capital adequacy ratio
(CAR), which is the ratio of bank capital and risk-weighted assets (RWA). Basel I sets the
CAR to be at least 8% in order to be adequately capitalized. Under Basel I, capital is
defined as Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. Therefore, banks must maintain Tier 1 and Tier 2
capital to be at least 8% of its risk-weighted assets. Tier 1 capital is also referred to as core
capital that has a strong capacity to absorb losses (Petersen and Mukuddam-Petersen,
2014). It consists of shareholders’ equity and retained earnings (Gup, 2004). Tier 2 capital
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is considered less reliable than Tier 1 capital. It includes additional internal and external
funds available to the bank such as subordinated debt and asset loss reserves. Subordinated
debts are bank-issued debts, for example bonds, that do not have to be repaid until all other
debts have been settled (Petersen and Mukuddam-Petersen, 2014).
The Basel I capital standard focuses mainly on credit risks. It is a simple risk-based
standard that uses only four risk weights for the following assets: 0% for cash and claims
on Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) sovereigns, 20%
for claims on OECD banks, OECD subnational government entities, and cash items in
process of collections, 50% for mortgage and local government projects finance in the
OECD countries, and 100% for commercial and consumer loans and loans to non-OECD
governments (Gup, 2004). The simple weight structure of Basel I prevented the capital
requirement from adequately reflecting the associated risks. Banks tend to shift their
portfolio’s composition toward lower quality assets in order to maintain the regulatory
capital ratio. In this situation, the regulatory capital ratio remains unchanged but the actual
risks increase. The simple structure cannot accommodate various types of banks that have
different risk profiles.
Basel II, which was introduced in 2001, is aimed to improve Basel I capital
regulations. The main difference from Basel I is that Basel II accommodates for a more
flexible risk weights. Basel II consists of three pillars: 1) minimum requirements, 2)
supervisory review, and 3) market disciplines (Bank for International Settlements). The
calculation of capital adequacy falls under the first pillar. Under Basel II, the definition of
capital and CAR do not change. It retains the minimum capital (CAR) to be at least 8% of
RWA. However, Basel II modifies the methodology for calculating RWA. The calculation
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of RWA incorporates credit risk, market risk, and operational risk. Measures of credit risks
are more complex in order to align the calculation of perceived risk of bank’s assets to the
actual risk. Credit risk can be measured using the Standardized Approach, the Foundation
Internal Rating Based Approach, and the Advanced Internal Rating-Based Approach. The
Standardized Approach is the simplest approach and more suitable for smaller banks while
the other two approaches are more suited for larger banks. The Standardized Approach
adds two more risk categories in addition to four categories used in Basel I. Moreover, it
uses external credit ratings from credit rating agencies to determine certain exposures’ risk
weights (Banks for International Settlements).
Basel III mainly sets the standards for liquidity. Liquidity involves bank’s ability
to purchase assets and meet its financial obligations without experiencing damaging losses.
Bank liquidity decreased during the 2007 financial crisis and has motivated the
introduction of Basel III capital and liquidity regulation in 2010 (Petersen and MukuddamPetersen, 2014).
This dissertation focuses on the implementation of Basel II and the minimum capital
requirements. Given the development and more significant role of the shadow banking
system around the globe in the last several years, this dissertation examines asset positions,
risk taking, and pro-cyclicality in relation to the implementation of Basel in the traditional
and shadow banking sector.
The first essay examines the impact of minimum capital requirements on the
shadow banking sector. The share of shadow to total banking assets is used to measure
shadow banking growth. Previous literature has argued that increased regulation of the
traditional banking sector will lead to regulatory arbitrage and increase in shadow banking
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activities. That is, banks shift their operation away from traditional banking into the less
regulated shadow banking sector when traditional banking activities are more heavily
regulated. This hypothesis is tested using data from 76 countries over the 2005 through
2010 period. The results provide some evidence in favor of the regulatory arbitrage
hypothesis, but only for high-income countries.
The second essay focuses on bank risk-taking behavior when the capital
requirement is strengthened. Risk is proxied by the share of non-performing loans to total
loans in the bank’s portfolio as a measure of ex-post risk and bank z-score as a measure of
ex-ante risk. The shadow banking sector is found to take on higher ex-ante risk while the
traditional banking sector tend to take on higher ex-post risks. Capital requirement is found
to be effective in reducing both ex-post and ex-ante risks
The third essay uses the relationship between leverage and assets to quantify the
pro-cyclicality of leverage and evaluates the impact of Basel II implementation on leverage
growth. Using panel data from 111 countries over the period of 2005-2011, pro-cyclicality
is examined for the shadow and traditional banking sectors. The key results indicate that
the traditional banking sector tends to be less pro-cyclical than the shadow banking sector
and that Basel II implementation intensifies the pro-cyclicality.
The three essays show that the shadow banking and traditional banking sectors
behave differently in term of their asset positions, risk taking, and pro-cyclicality. The
results also suggest that bank and country heterogeneity play a role in the behavioral
differences detected across sectors.
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CHAPTER 2
CAPITAL REGULATION AND SHADOW BANKING

2.1 Introduction
This essay examines the impact of national minimum capital requirements on the
share of shadow banking assets to total banking assets across countries. The shadow
banking sector comprises of financial intermediaries that do not have access to central bank
funds and perform their activities outside the regular banking system (Financial Stability
Board, 2011). Pozsar et al. (2013) and Acharya et al. (2013) have argued that capital
requirement regulations lead to regulatory arbitrage. That is, banks shift their operations
away from traditional banking into the less regulated shadow banking sector when
traditional activities are more heavily regulated. Acharya et al. (2013) argued further that
regulatory arbitrage is the main motivation for setting up conduits, one of the most common
financial instruments used in shadow banking. If regulatory arbitrage holds, then we should
expect to see that a more stringent capital requirement encourages a relatively larger
shadow banking sector, all other thing equal. Pozsar et al. (2013) identify additional
determinants of shadow banking activities in addition to regulatory capital arbitrage.
Shadow banking activities may arise from financial intermediation outside traditional
banking due to specialization and comparative advantage over the traditional banking
system. However, in this study we will focus on the regulatory arbitrage explanation for
shadow banking growth.
The shadow banking system has been growing quickly in most developed
economies, at least until the global financial crisis. From 2004 to 2008, U.S. shadow
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banking assets exceeded traditional banking assets, although falling since 2008 (Deloitte,
2012). Pozsar et al. (2013) document that the U.S shadow banking system size, measured
by bank liabilities, was about $22 trillion in June 2007, which is significantly larger than
traditional bank liabilities at about $14 trillion. After the financial crisis, the size of the
shadow banking sector has fallen but the liabilities of traditional banking sector continue
to grow. Acharya et al. (2010) show that asset-backed commercial paper conduits (ACBP)
have the biggest share of money market instruments in 2007. The ACBP is one of the most
representative financial instruments in the shadow banking system.
This essay distinguishes traditional from shadow banks according to the standard
industrial classifications (SIC) from the Office of Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA). Specifically, we classify financial institutions under SIC code 60
as traditional banks and SIC code 61 as shadow banks. Traditional banks, often referred to
as depository institutions, are subject to regulatory capital. The capital requirement is
designed to provide a safety net and limits banks from taking excessive risks. Capital
requirements are aimed at mitigating risks in the traditional banking sector by ensuring that
there is enough capital to sustain losses. However, if capital requirements encourage
shadow banking growth through regulatory arbitrage then risks are simply transferred into
the shadow banking sector. Thus, if the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis is in fact correct,
capital requirements cannot effectively minimize banking risks when shadow banking
activity is less regulated and not subject to capital requirements. Most countries apply
capital requirements for banks as proposed by Basel I or Basel II. Basel I and II required
banks to maintain a minimum 8% capital adequacy ratio. The capital adequacy ratio is
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calculated as the ratio of the bank's capital to its risk-weighted assets (Petersen and
Mukuddam-Petersen, 2014).
Following the financial crisis, the global trend in banking regulation is to heighten
the capital requirements. Basel III sets yet a higher capital requirement compared to Basel
I and II. The total capital requirement, set at 10.5%, will be implemented in 2019. Basel III
also adds leverage ratio requirements to supplement the minimum capital requirements
(Bank for International Settlements). Studies that investigate the role of banking regulation
(Hanson et al. 2011 and Adrian and Ashcraft, 2012) suggest that while higher regulatory
capital helps to reduce the impact of a shock, it also increases shadow banking activity.
This essay examines whether minimum capital requirements have an impact on
shadow banking assets. The sample contains panel data from 76 countries over the period
2005, 2008, 2009 and 2010. Shadow banks are defined as Non-depository Credit
Institutions (code 61) under the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system and
shadow banking activity is measured by the share of shadow banking assets to the sum of
shadow and traditional bank assets. The minimum capital requirement that is used in this
study is collected from the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey (BRSS) conducted by
the World Bank.
The results suggest that capital requirements have an impact on the share of shadow
banking assets to total banking assets only in high income countries. Therefore, it seems
that the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis is supported in these countries. These results are in
accordance with the previous studies (Pozsar et al. 2013 and Acharya et al. 2013) who
simply use descriptive statistics or ACBP conduits suggesting that regulatory arbitrage
takes place.
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Furthermore, most of the previous studies examine the shadow banking sector in
the developed countries only. To the best of our knowledge this is the first study to
empirically test in a rigorous manner the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis using the relative
size of traditional and shadow banking assets in both low and high income economies.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section I present the
literature review. Section 3 explains capital regulation across countries. Section 4 describes
the data that are used. Section 5 and 6 discuss the empirical model and results and finally
section 7 concludes.

2.2 Literature Review
The literature on shadow banking is relatively recent. Most studies that investigate
the role of shadow banking have been motivated by the recent global financial crisis. There
is variation in how the literature defines shadow banking as well as how to measure it. The
term shadow banking was coined by Paul McCulley (2007) who define it as “the whole
soup of levered up non-bank investment conduits, vehicles, and structures”. Pozsar et al.
(2010) provide a broader definition, “shadow banks are financial intermediaries that
conduct maturity, credit, and liquidity transformation without access to central bank
liquidity or public sector credit guarantees”. Schwarz (2012) argues that even the broader
definition only covers entities. He further defines shadow banking activity to comprise not
only the products and services provided by shadow bank but also the financial markets that
facilitate the provision of those products and services.
Studies have been using different proxies to measure shadow banking. Pozsar et al.
(2012) measure the shadow banking size using data from the Federal Reserve Board’s flow
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of funds. The data consist of liabilities related to securitization activity and short term
money market transactions that are not backstopped by deposit insurance. Summing these
can provide a measure of the size of the shadow banking sector. Adrian and Shin (2009)
define the shadow banking system as market-based financial system especially those that
are involve in securitization process. Some examples of institutions that are involve in the
securitization process are government sponsor enterprises, asset-backed securities (ABS)
issuers, and broker-dealers. Acharya et al. (2013) uses asset-backed commercial paper
(ABCP) conduits to identify shadow banking activity. Other studies such as Acharya et al.
(2010) define shadow banks based on the standard industrial classifications (SIC) codes,
defining shadow banks as financial institutions categorized under the two-digit SIC code
61.
Following the global financial crisis, there is a trend of imposing heighted capital
requirement regulation on the traditional banking system. Basel III, which will be fully
phased in by 2019 increases the minimum capital requirement to 10.5%. The financial
crisis also motivated literature that emphasizes and proposes regulatory reform to maintain
shadow banking system stability (Adrian and Shin, 2009 and Adrian and Ashcraft, 2010).
Since the adoption of the first Basel accord, capital requirement regulations have been an
important feature of the banking industry.
Capital requirement regulations have been argued to cause regulatory arbitrage. The
first working paper (Jackson et al. 1999) by the Basel committee assesses the impact of
capital requirements empirically after ten years of implementation of the first Basel accord.
This study examines whether the capital requirements are effectively limiting risk taking
behavior since capital requirements are intended to limit banks from taking excessive risk.
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The study also examines, whether instead of restricting the risk taking, capital requirements
induce banks to behave in ways that reduce the effectiveness of the requirements. One way
to do this is through capital regulation arbitrage. Jackson et al. (1999) argue that capital
regulation arbitrage is a result of keeping the funding cost low. As cost of equity is
perceived to be higher than cost of debt (Stein, 2012), minimum capital requirement is seen
as a form of taxation by banks. Capital regulation arbitrage is used as a devise to avoid or
minimize the taxes.
Jackson et al. (1999) identify several methods of capital regulation arbitrage in the
U.S. as the reaction from the first Basel accord. For instance bank may shift the portfolio
composition towards the riskiest assets within a particular risk-weight category so that the
capital ratio is unchanged while the overall risk increases. Kashyap et al. (2010), Pozsar et
al. (2013) and Acharya et al. (2013) suggest that capital regulation arbitrage encourages
migration of credit creation activity from traditional to shadow banking. That is, higher
capital requirements increases shadow banking size.
Studies that formally analyze capital regulation arbitrage are limited. Plantin (2014)
formulates optimal capital requirement regulations when there exist endogenous financial
innovation. If the enforcement of such regulation is not perfect, banks can get around the
capital requirement regulation and shift towards shadow banking system to increase
leverage. The more constrained is a bank by the capital requirement the more it is willing
to shift its activity. Therefore increasing capital requirements boost the relative size of the
shadow banking sector.
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2.3 Capital Regulatory Framework
2.3.1 Basel’s Minimum Capital Requirements
In most countries banks are subject to minimum capital requirements. Traditional
requirements require banks to hold a certain amount of capital. Other countries require a
specific leverage capital ratio, that is, the ratio of capital to assets. This ratio is intended to
keep capital in line with the balance sheet size. Recognizing that the creditworthiness of
borrowers vary, risk-based capital ratio requirements were introduced by the 1988 Capital
Accord (Basel I). The accord was proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS). It requires a risk-based capital ratio of at least 8% for credit risk.
Risk-based capital ratio assigns different risk weights according to the borrower’s ability
to meet its obligation (Lind, 2005).
The Basel II framework was initially introduced in 2004. It was proposed to
incorporate the developments, in theory and in practice, of measuring risk. It has three
pillars, minimum capital requirements, supervisory review, and market discipline (Bank
for International Settlements). Figure 1 displays these three pillars. Pillar 1 contains the
capital requirements for credit risk, market risk and operational risk. Under Pillar 1, banks
may choose from different alternatives to calculate the capital ratio. The choice of approach
usually depends on the banks’ level of complexity. There are at least two approaches for
calculating the credit risk. The standardized approach is the simplest approach. In this case,
banks can modify the range of risks weights by using credit risk assessments from reputable
rating agencies. A second approach is referred to as the internal rating based (IRB)
approach. There is also a more advance IRB approach in which even larger part of capital
requirements is influenced by the internal estimates. For market risk, there are also simple
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and advanced alternative to choose from. For operational risk there are three alternatives:
Basic Indicator Approach, Standardized Approach and Advanced Measurement Approach
(AMA). In this framework, more advanced approaches imply less capital requirement and
more advanced banks are more likely to apply the more advanced approaches (Lind, 2005).
Figure 2 shows the detail of the first pillar.
Both Basel I and II require at least 8% ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets. Basel
III was released in 2010. Under the Basel III framework the minimum capital requirement
has been increased to 10.5%. The implementation of Basel accords varies across countries.
Based on a survey conducted by the Financial Stability Institute on 2004 and 2006, eightyfour percent of respondents worldwide intend to apply Basel II framework between 2007
and 2015. Not every country will adopt Basel II framework, but all countries in Asia and
Middle East will adopt Basel II framework. The survey also indicates that under Pillar I,
most countries have adopted the standardized approach.
2.3.2 Theory of Capital Regulations
This section describes the channels by which capital requirements lead to changes
in bank’s assets. The aim of minimum capital requirements is to prevent banks from taking
excessive risks and provide cushions against losses from shocks. Hanson et al. (2011) argue
that by setting higher requirements, regulators can reduce the probability of bank failures.
The type of capital can be in different forms as long as it can be used to bear the losses,
such as common equity, preferred stocks or subordinated debts. It is also assumed that
banks restore the capital ratio immediately after experiencing losses.
Bank can maintain its capital ratio after a negative shock in two manners: 1) by
obtaining additional capital from an external source or 2) decreasing asset levels and
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leaving the capital unchanged (Please see Figure 3). If only one bank shrinks its assets, for
instance, by cutting their credit to maintain its capital ratio, it is likely to have little or no
effect on the economy as other banks can make up for the decrease in credit. However, the
effect on the overall economy and banking system will be more severe if a large proportion
of banks cut their assets at the same time.
Banks are most likely to choose the second option, that is, adjust the asset positions.
Adrian and Shin (2009) have documented that during the boom and just before the 2007
financial crisis banks expanded their assets. As the balance sheets expand, banks need to
find new borrowers and when good borrowers have been exhausted, bank lend to subprime
borrowers. This is the seed of the crisis.
Hanson et al. (2011) argument, that banks tend to change their assets rather than
their equity, is supported by Adrian and Shin (2010). Adrian and Shin (2010) show that
bank’s leverage is pro-cyclical with respect to assets; that is, leverage is high when the
asset position is high while banks tend to keep equity relatively constant overtime. The
reason banks raise their leverage when the economy is expanding is to increase profits. The
pro-cyclicality also means banks cut their lending during recession.
The fire sale model also explains why banks adjust their assets instead of
recapitalize (Shleifer and Vishny, 2010). Capital requirement can be used as a stabilizing
tool, they restrict balance sheet expansions in booming periods and they also reduce the
use of fire sales, where banks are forced to sell their asset at a highly discounted price due
to financial distress, in the downturn. During the boom, the bank expands its balance sheet
to increase profits. One way to increase the balance sheet or assets is by securitization. If
the upturn continues, bank will keep expanding the balance sheets since security prices are
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high in this period. Banks can sell the security at a higher price and thus higher profits.
Higher capital requirements limit balance sheet expansion (securitization) when the price
is above the real value of the security in the upturn. Similarly, in the downturn, lower
capital requirements restrict banks from selling their portfolio holdings at a much lower
price than their fundamental values (asset fire sales) and reduce contraction of the balance
sheets (Shleifer and Vishny, 2010).
The choice between adjusting assets and obtaining new capital depends on the costs
as described in the previous paragraphs. Stein (2012) compares the cost of funding for
banks and shows that short term debt is less costly than adjusting through equity. Therefore,
banks prefer to take on debts instead of recapitalizing. Debt is also safer because in bad
times, bank can sell their assets. The possibility of selling these assets and the low cost
nature of this activity leads banks to create and obtain funds excessively by creating
excessive short-term debts. This funding source is referred to as private money.
Similar to Stein’s argument, raising equity capital is more expensive than short or
long-term debt financing (Kashyap et al., 2010). Issuing a new public equity can be seen
as a negative signal by the market. This is the case because firms tend to sell their stock
when it is overvalued, thus this may push their stock prices down. However, the cost of
raising equity can be reduced if banks are allowed to grow equity capital from retained
earnings overtime (Kashyap et al., 2010).
In sum, altering the assets position is more desirable for banks in need of
maintaining their capital ratio because it incurs lower costs than adjusting equity (Shleifer
and Vishny, 2010; Stein (2012); Kashyap et al., 2010). Therefore, minimum capital
requirements can be utilized to influence the banks’ assets positions. The requirements
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basically restrict banks’ incentive to increase their profits. The lower profitability in the
traditional banking sector due to capital requirements have two effects. It reduces
traditional banking sector activities and gives incentive for more activity in the shadow
banking sector. Thus, higher capital requirements shrink the traditional banking sector and
expand the shadow banking sector.
2.4 Data
The study examines the impact of capital requirements on the share of shadow
banking assets to total banking assets across countries. It uses shadow bank assets across
countries over the 2005 through 2010 period. The assets data are obtained from Orbis
database published by Bureau van Dijk (BvD). It covers both listed and unlisted companies
around the world. The database contains information on financial data, ownership, stock
data, and location. The database is usually used in studies that require financial or nonfinancial firm-level data.
The original individual bank sample consists of 366,097 individual banks across
countries. To get shadow bank assets in a specific country, the individual asset data are
aggregated by summing all shadow bank assets in the country. The share of shadow
banking asset is defined as the ratio of shadow banking assets to the sum of shadow and
traditional banking assets. The final number of observation at the country level are 304.
I define shadow banks by following Acharya et al. (2010). They identify four types
of financial institutions according to the SIC codes. The classification is based on the Office
of Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA). OSHA categorizes finance,
insurance, and real estate under division H which is identified as code 6000 through 6799.
This broad division is divided into seven categories; depository institutions (code 6011-
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6099), non-depository credit institutions (code 6111-6163), Security and Commodity
Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, and Service (code 6211-6289), Insurance Carriers (code
6311-6399), Insurance Agents, Brokers, and Service (6411), Real Estate (code 6512-6553),
Holding and Other Investment Offices (code 6712-6799) (www.osha.gov).
Adrian and Shin (2010) define the shadow banking sector as the sector that contains
asset-backed security issuers, finance companies, and funding companies according to the
Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds guide. Therefore, based on their market segment I define
shadow bank as the non-depository credit institutions (code 6111-6163). This shadow
banking sector comprises credit agencies, personal and business credit institutions, and
mortgage bankers and brokers. These categories are good proxies for asset-backed
securities issuers.
This essay examines how changes in capital requirements affect the relative size of the
shadow banking sector. Thus, the main explanatory variable is the minimum capital
requirement. The minimum capital requirement data are obtained from the Bank
Regulation and Supervision Survey (BRSS) conducted by the World Bank. The data for
2005, 2008, 2009 and 2010 are drawn from BRSS Survey III and IV. The survey was
addressed to the head of banking supervision at the central bank or to the head of a separate
banking supervision agency. In some countries, the agency delegates completion of the
questionnaire to the senior-level staff (Cihak et al. 2012 and www.worldbank.org). The
minimum capital requirement variable is taken from one of the survey question, “What was
the minimum required risk-based regulatory capital ratio as of end of (year)?”
There are three sets of other explanatory variables: economic development,
financial sector and banking sector indicators. The economic development indicators
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include GDP growth and openness. Openness is measured by the percentage of total trade
to GDP. GDP growth and openness data are obtain from the World Bank. The financial
sector development indicators include financial system deposits and stock market
capitalization. The data are obtained from Global Financial Development Database
(GFDD) World Bank. The financial system deposit is the ratio of demand, time and saving
deposits in deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. The stock market
capitalization variable is the ratio of total value of all listed shares in a stock market to
GDP. These two variables are intended to capture other determinants of shadow banking
activity. An economy that has a more advance financial system tends to require more
shadow banking services such as services related to securitizations. Thus, financial system
deposit and stock market capitalization are used to proxy the depth of financial systems.
The last sets of explanatory variables are the banking sector indicators. These
include return on assets (ROA), profit margin, and the country z-score. ROA measures the
return in terms of assets. It has been argued that banking sector activities are spurred by
the profitability of this sector. ROA and profit margin capture the banking sector
profitability, thus they are included as explanatory variables. The ROA data are obtained
from Orbis. The country z-score measures the probability of default of a country's banking
system. Z-scores compare the buffer of a country's banking system (capitalization and
returns) with the volatility of those returns. The data are obtained from GFDD database,
World Bank.
Table 1 displays the summary statistics for the variables that are used in the
analysis. The total number of observation is 304. All data are at the country level. The data
that are originally at the individual bank level such as assets, ROA, and profit margins are

21

aggregated into the country level. The mean of the minimum capital ratio is 9.3%. It is
slightly higher than the minimum requirement suggested by the BIS. Most countries
implement 8% minimum capital requirements, while some other countries adopt a ratio
higher than 8%. Nigeria set the capital ratio in 2010 to 19%, which is the highest capital
ratio in the dataset (Table 2).
2.5 Empirical Model
Previous literature suggests that there are two important factors in determining the
relative size of the shadow banking sector. First, the regulatory framework plays a role.
Regulations that increase costs for the traditional banking sector encourage the further
development of the shadow banking sector. Second, with respect to some activities, the
shadow banking sector may have a comparative advantage over the traditional banking
sector, driving business toward the less regulated sector (Pozsar et al., 2012 and Acharya
et al., 2013). The empirical model incorporates proxies for these indicators for comparative
advantage, which are proxied by profit margin and ROA. Profit margin and ROA show
how profitable shadow banking sector is in comparison with the traditional sector. We then
test the hypothesis whether the regulatory framework, in this case minimum capital
requirements, significantly impact the relative size of shadow banking.
To assess the impact of capital requirements on the relative size of the shadow
banking sector, we utilize an empirical model of the following form:
′
where

(1)

is the proportion of shadow banking assets to total of traditional and shadow

banking assets in country i at time t,

is minimum capital requirement that is set in

country i at time t, and ′ is a vector of explanatory variables in country i at time t. These
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explanatory variables are GDP growth, openness, financial system deposits, stock market
capitalization, ROA, profit margin, and z-score. The penultimate term,
unobservable country-specific effects and

, denotes

is the independent and identically distributed

error term.
If the regulatory arbitrage view holds, the coefficient on

will be positive

suggesting that the traditional and shadow banking are competing sectors. A more
regulated traditional banking sector shifts banking activities into the less regulated shadow
banking sector. Therefore, higher capital requirements in the traditional banking sector
encourage more shadow banking activities. It is expected that the economic, financial
sector, and profitability indicators are positively related to shadow banking activity, while
the probability of banking sector default, as measured by country z-scores, is inversely
related to the activity.
2.5.1

Endogeneity
Profit margin and ROA are endogenous. There may be reverse causality between

assets and ROA (and profit margin), thus it is also difficult to determine the direction of
the causal relationship between profit margin and ROA and assets. As an illustration, on
one hand large banks that have bigger assets tend get higher margin due to economies of
scale. On the other hand, higher profit margin may cause banks to accumulate more assets.
We use pooled least squares and fixed effect approaches to test the regulatory
arbitrage hypothesis. In the pooled least square model, both year and country dummies are
included. Pooled least squares and fixed effects approaches are appropriate to use because
they take into account different economic and financial system characteristics across
countries. However, they do not provide straightforward solutions for the endogeneity
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problem. We could use instrumental variable method to overcome this problem but finding
an instrument is difficult. Therefore, we implement Hausman-Taylor approach to account
for endogeneity. The approach does not require external instruments in solving the
endogeneity.
This essay uses capital requirement set by the financial regulator or government
agencies exogenously in the various countries in our study. In this sense, the capital
requirement is exogenous in relation to total assets. Some may argue that capital
requirements have the potential to be endogenous. Regulators may set higher minimum
capital requirements in order to prevent traditional banks from taking excessive risks,
which in turn encourages more shadow banking activities. In addition, risk taking is also
one motive for engaging in shadow banking business. Thus, endogeneity may come from
the fact that risk affects both shadow banking activities and capital requirements.
To deal with the source of endogeneity, we follow the Hausman-Taylor method
(Hausman and Taylor, 1981). The method is basically based on the instrumental variable
approach to solve for endogneity. Hausman and Taylor (1981) suggest implementing this
approach as follows. The time-varying variables are instrumented by their deviation from
the individual mean. This is analogous to the fixed effect within estimator approach. The
exogenous variables serve as their own instruments and the time-invariant endogeneous
variables are instrumented by the individual average of time-varying exogenous variable.
The method has two advantages. First, it allows us to estimate the effect of time-invariant
variables. Second, it does not require external instruments for the endogenous variables in
the model. Fixed effect estimation will eliminate any time-invariant variables, as it sweep
away all the fixed unobserved individual characteristics. Hausman and Taylor also argue
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that the fixed effect estimates of time-varying variable will be consistent but inefficient
because they are needlessly instrumented. In this paper, we assume capital requirements,
profit margin, ROA, and the interaction term of capital requirement are endogenous. Using
the Hausman-Taylor approach, these endogenous variables are instrumented by the mean
of its deviation from individual mean.
2.6 Results
The regression results are presented in Tables 3 and 4. The numbers in the
parentheses are P-values. We use three methods to estimate the impact of capital
requirements on the proportion of shadow banking assets to total banking assets. The first
two set of regression results that are shown in Table 3. Column 1 of Table 3 presents the
pooled least squares estimates and Column 2 of Table 2 shows the fixed effect estimates.
We include the interaction of the capital requirement and the level of development.
Development is a dummy variable, which takes values of 1 for high-income countries and
0 otherwise. We follow the World Bank to classify1 countries into high-income and
middle/low-income country groups. We grouped the low and middle-income country into
one category and high-income countries into the other category. We refer to high-income
countries as the developed countries and low and middle-income countries as the
developing countries in the rest of the essay.

1

The World Bank has classified countries according to their income as high-income, middleincome, and low income countries. According to their classification, low-income economies are
defined as those with a GNI per capita of $1,035 or less as of July 2013; middle-income economies
are those with a GNI per capita of more than $1,036 but less than $12,615; high-income economies
are those with a GNI per capita of $12,616 or more (http://data.worldbank.org/news/new-countryclassifications).
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Column 1 of Table 3 shows that when using the pooled regression results, only the
development variable is significant. This coefficient indicates that the share of shadow
banking assets are different between developed and developing countries. This positive
coefficient indicates that, not surprisingly, the shadow banking sector tend to be higher in
developed countries. However, the pooled estimation is not the best specification because
it does not account for country and time unobserved fixed effects.
Column 2 of Table 3 reports the fixed effects estimates, in which country and year
dummies are included in the estimation. The coefficients of capital requirement and the
interaction term are used to test the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis. The capital
requirement is not significant but the interaction term of capital requirement and
development is at 5% level. The F-test for capital requirement and the interaction term
suggest that they are jointly significant with F=56 and p-value 0.000. The interaction term
coefficient indicates that on average a one percentage point increase (say an adjustment
from 8 percent to 9 percent) in the minimum capital requirement leads to an increase in the
share of shadow banking by 0.15 in developed countries relative to developing countries.
At the mean, the share of shadow banking assets is 0.13. Shadow banks account for 13
percent of total banking assets, therefore a one percentage point increase in the capital
requirement will raise the share to 0.28. The shadow banking system will enlarge so that
they account for 28 percent of total banking assets.
Financial system deposit, stock market capitalization, and openness have a
significant impact on the share of shadow banking assets. Financial system deposit
measures the depth of financial system in a country. It also captures the level of financial
development. As expected it has a positive impact on the share of shadow banking assets.
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Stock market capitalization, on the other hand, is inversely related to the share of shadow
banking assets. Aside from being a proxy of financial sector development, the stock market
also provides financial services. We expected stock market capitalization to be positively
related to the share of shadow banking assets, the more developed the financial sector the
higher the share of shadow banking assets. The inverse relationship may be caused by
similarity in the services provided by the stock market and shadow banks. Thus, larger
stock market capitalization may be associated with a lower share of shadow banking assets
in an economy. Profit margin and ROA are calculated as the average across individual
banks’ margin and ROA. As can be seen in Table 3, the development variable is dropped
since it is fixed overtime. The openness variable is significant at the 5% level, meaning
that economies that are more open to international trade are associated with a larger share
of shadow banking assets. Thus, international trade activities may require shadow banking
services.
For low-income countries, capital requirements do not have an impact on the share
of shadow banking assets. These results imply that regulatory arbitrage only takes place in
high-income countries and we do not see regulatory arbitrage in developing countries. The
shadow banking system in developing countries can be too small relative to total banking
activity so that the capital requirements do not have a significant impact on shadow
banking. As discussed in the previous sections, shadow banks mainly conduct three
functions: maturity, credit, and liquidity transformation. The demand for these functions
typically come from countries with a more developed financial sector.
To take care of the endogenous variables, equation (1) is reestimated using the
Hausman-Taylor approach. The results are presented in Table 4. All of the time-invariant
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variables such as development and all of the country dummies can now be estimated. We
assume that the variables that are endogenous are profit margin, ROA, and capital
requirement. To control for unobserved fixed factor across countries and year, country and
year dummy are included in the estimation but their coefficients are not reported. The
estimates are similar to the fixed effect estimates. Development is now significant. Capital
requirement does not have a significant impact but the interaction between development
and capital requirements does has a significant impact. Jointly, development and the
interaction of capital requirement and development are significant at the 5% level2. On
average, a one percent increase in the minimum capital requirement leads to an increase in
the share of shadow bank of 0.15 in high-income countries. Using this estimation method,
openness does not have a significant impact on the share of shadow banking assets.
Financial system deposit and stock market capitalization both significantly impact the
shadow banking share.
2.6.1

Diagnostic Tests
Thus paper uses pooled, fixed effect, and the Hausman-Taylor approach to estimate

the regulatory hypothesis. Baltagi et al (2003) proposed a procedure to select the best
method among random effect, fixed effect, and Hausman-Taylor estimation. They suggest
applying the Hausman test as follows: 1) use Hausman test to choose between random and
fixed effect method. In this step, if the Hausman test statistics is not rejected then random
effect method is better. 2) Use a second Hausman test to choose between the fixed effect
and Hausman-Taylor approach. Choose the Hausman-Taylor approach if the Hausman test

2

The joint tests yield the same results for all specifications.
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statistics is not rejected. 3) If the previous two tests are rejected, the fixed effect estimation
is the best method.
The results show that the chi-square statistics is 64 (P-value: 0.000) for the first
Hausman test, suggesting that the fixed effect method is preferable to the random effect.
The chi-square statistics for the second Hausman test is 13 (P-value: 0.112). This result
suggests that Hausman-Taylor method is better than the fixed effect method. Therefore,
overall the Hausman-Taylor approach is preferable to the random and fixed effect
approach.
2.6.2 Predictive Performance Tests
This section assesses the models by testing their accuracy in predicting the
dependent variable. The model selection procedure in the previous section suggests that
the Hausman-Taylor approach is the best, therefore in this section we carry out predictive
performance tests based on the Hausman-Taylor results. We use three approaches in
carrying out the test.
First, compare the density of the dependent variable (proportion of shadow banking
assets to total banking assets, Y) and the in-sample prediction of this dependent variable
( ) to see how well the model has performed in terms of predicting the dependent variable.
We use kernel density estimation to compare the density between these two variables
(Figure 5). The kernel densities in Figure 5 are estimated using Silverman’s optimal
bandwidth. The graph suggests that both variables have very similar distribution.
Second, compare the distributions of the dependent variable (Y) and its linear
predictions ( ) using the quantile-quantile (QQ) plot (Figure 6). The QQ plot provides the
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plots of the quantiles of Y against the quantiles of . Figure 6 indicates that overall the two
distributions are fairly similar. Most data points lie in the diagonal line and only few points,
at the tail of the distribution, are slightly above or under the line.
Third, compare the distribution of Y and

and test if they have similar distributions

using the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The null hypothesis is that the two
samples are drawn from populations with identical distributions. The test indicates that the
p-value is 0.9, suggesting that we fail to reject that the two distributions are equal. In sum,
the kernel density estimates, the QQ plot, and the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
imply that our empirical model does a good job in predicting Y.
2.7 Conclusions
The literature on shadow banking has identified important determinants of shadow
banking activities. Pozsar et al. (2013) and Acharya et al. (2013) argue that one of the most
important determinants is regulatory arbitrage. That is, banks shift their operation away
from traditional banking into the less regulated shadow banking sector when traditional
banking activities are more heavily regulated. This essay tests empirically the regulatory
arbitrage hypothesis.
This essay tests the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis using cross-country banking
asset data over the period 2005, 2008, 2009, and 2010. It focuses on minimum capital
requirement regulations that are applied by countries in the sample. The shadow banking
sector is not subjected to the minimum capital requirements, thus we are able to examine
the impact of this regulation on the share of shadow banking asset to total baking assets.
The minimum capital requirement and the interaction between the capital requirements and
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development are jointly significant. The interaction term suggests that capital requirement
has a significantly different impact on developed countries relative to developing countries.
Its impact is also economically significant. This result implies that the regulatory arbitrage
hypothesis holds in high-income countries relative to the developing countries. This may
be because shadow banking provides services for transactions that are more typical in more
advanced financial systems. In developed countries, on average, one percentage point
increase in the minimum capital requirement leads to 0.15 increase in the share of shadow
banking assets relative to the developing countries, raising the share, at the average, from
0.13 to 0.28.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable
Assets
Share of shadow bank assets1
Shadow bank assets
Traditional bank assets

Unit

Mean

Ratio
billion US$
billion US$

Capital regulation
Minimum capital requirement

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

0.13
268
549

0.13
929
1,850

0.00005
0.009
0.007

0.77
7,570
16,400

ratio

0.093

0.018

0.08

0.19

Economic indicators
Openness2
GDP growth

ratio
percent

0.949
2.617

0.581
4.978

0.221
-17.955

5.621
44.023

Financial sector indicators
Financial system deposit3
Stock market capitalization4

ratio
ratio

0.649
0.564

0.554
0.647

0.0437
0.0037

3.946
5.695

0.094
0.013
10.561

0.166
0.032
11.202

-0.646
-0.244
-5.5

0.835
0.288
70.51

Banking sector indicators
Profit margin5
Return on assets (ROA)6
Z-score7
Number of observations
Source: Orbis and World Bank

ratio
ratio
percent
304

Note:
1. Share of shadow banking asset=
2. Openness=
3. The financial system deposit is the ratio of demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money
banks and other financial institutions to GDP.
4. The stock market capitalization is the ratio of total value of all listed shares in a stock market to
GDP.
5. Profit margin=
6. ROA=
7. Z-score measures the probability of default of a country's banking system. Z-score compares the
buffer of a country's banking system (capitalization and returns) with the volatility of those
returns.
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Table 2.2: Distribution of Minimum Capital Requirement Adopted by Countries
(in %)
Minimum Capital
Requirement
0.08
0.09
0.091
0.1
0.11
0.12
0.13
0.15
0.19
Total
Source: BRSS, World Bank
Note: * Nigeria

2005
55.5
5.5
0.9
20.0
1.8
14.6
0.9
0.9
100

2008
53.9
6.1
21.7
0.9
14.8
2.6
100
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2009
53.0
4.4
22.6
0.9
15.7
0.9
2.6
100

2010
51.9
5.7
19.8
0.9
17.9
2.8
0.9*
100

Table 2.3: Regression Results: Pooled and Fixed Effect
Dependent variable:
Proportion of shadow banking
Capital requirement

(1)
-0.294
(0.549)

(2)
0.026
(0.926)

-2.339
(0.101)

15.247**
(0.000)

Development

0.272**
(0.025)

_

Profit margin

0.059
(0.188)

-0.005
(0.828)

-0.137
(0.49)

-0.008
(0.919)

Z-score

-0.0002
(0.695)

0.001
(0.470)

Openness

0.002
(0.888)

0.014**
(0.001)

GDP growth

-0.0008
(0.553)

0.0004
(0.442)

Financial system deposits

0.018
(0.320)

0.082*
(0.096)

Stock market capitalization

-0.022
(0.117)

-0.050**
(0.014)

Constant

0.121
(0.021)
304
0.12

-0.452**
(0.000)
304

Capital requirement*Development

Return on assets

N
Adj. R2
R2 within
Between
Overall
Method of estimation

Pooled least squares

Note: numbers in parentheses are p-value
* indicates statistically significant at 10% level
** indicates statistically significant at 5% level
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0.29
0.16
0.11
Fixed effect with country
and year dummy

Table 2.4: Regression Results: Hausman-Taylor
Dependent variable:
Proportion of shadow banking
Time-variant endogenous
Return on assets

(1)
0.009
(0.926)

Profit margin

-0.005
(0.839)

Capital requirement

-0.026
(0.945)

Capital requirement*Development

15.247**
(0.000)

Time-invariant exogenous
Development

-0.846**
(0.000)

Time-variant exogenous
Z-score

0.001
(0.199)

Openness

0.014
(0.110)

GDP growth

0.000
(0.526)

Financial system deposit

0.082**
(0.008)

Stock market capitalization

-0.050**
(0.000)

Constant

-0.040
(0.719)
304
3437.6
0.000

N
Wald
P-value
Method of estimation

Hausman-Taylor approach

Note: numbers in parentheses are p-value
* indicates statistically significant at 10% level
** indicates statistically significant at 5% level
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Figure 2.1: Basel II
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Figure 2.2: Pillar 1 of Basel II
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Figure 2.3: Individual Bank Balance Sheet
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Figure 2.4: Share of Shadow Banking Assets (%)
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Note: U.S., Germany, Greece, Kazakhstan and Nigeria experienced systemic banking crisis
started in 2007 and 2008 (Laeven and Valencia, 2012)
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Figure 2.5: Kernel density estimates for Y and
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Note: Y is the dependent variable, which is the proportion of shadow banking assets to
total banking assets. is in-sample prediction of Y after Hausman-Taylor regression. The
bandwidth is set according to Silverman’s rule of thumb.
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Figure 2.6: Quantile-quantile (QQ) Plot
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Note: Y is the dependent variable, which is the proportion of shadow banking assets to
total banking assets. is in-sample prediction of Y after Hausman-Taylor regression.
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CHAPTER 3
THE IMPACT OF BANKING REGULATION ON BANK RISK TAKING

3.1 Introduction
This essay examines the impact of minimum capital requirements on bank risk
taking. We focus on whether minimum capital requirements are able to mitigate bank risk
taking and assess how these affect both traditional and shadow banks.
Capital regulations are intended to influence bank incentives to take risks. The main
objective of minimum capital regulation is to prevent banks from taking excessive risks.
To achieve this goal, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has proposed minimum
capital requirement standards through Basel I, II, and III.
There are, in fact, a number of different theoretical arguments that have been
offered about the effectiveness of capital requirements in reducing bank risks. As shown
by Kim and Santomero (1988), a risk-based minimum capital requirement is effective for
controlling bank risks, as long as the risk weights are chosen optimally. However, in
another study, Gennotte and Pyle (1991) suggest the opposite outcome; capital regulations
may increase risks. Restrictions will lower future profits and to compensate for this
reduction, banks assume more risk by investing more heavily in risky assets in an attempt
to increase their profits.
In line with Kim and Santomero (1988), the capital requirements proposed in Basel
I, II, and III are risk-based capital standards. Basel I proposes a simple capital standard and
it mainly focuses on addressing credit risks. This capital standard was later revised (in
1996) to incorporate market risk. To calculate the risk-based capital ratio Basel I only uses
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five weights for different types of assets (BIS, 1998). Basel II improves the framework by
incorporating market risk, operational risk, and supervision in addition to credit risk to be
more closely aligned with the bank’s actual risk. Both Basel I and II require banks to hold
total capital to at least 8% of their risk-weighted assets (BIS, 2004). Basel III was initially
introduced in 2010 in response to the global financial crisis. It focuses on improving
resilience to system wide shocks, improving risk management, and improving bank’s
transparency. The Basel III capital requirement will be fully implemented in 2019 (BIS,
2011).
While there have been attempts via regulations to safeguard the financial sector,
minimum capital regulations only apply to the traditional banking sector. Thus the impact
of these regulation will likely differ with respect to risk taking for traditional and shadow
banks. As emphasized by Gorton et al (2010) and Pozsar et al (2012) the shadow banking
sector played a significant role in the recent global financial crisis. It is argued that the
sector employed high risk activities. Therefore we need to consider this sector too when
evaluating the impact of regulations on financial stability.
Similar to traditional banks shadow banks provide credit intermediation and
conduct maturity, liquidity, and credit transformations (Pozsar et al, 2012). The traditional
banking system mainly uses deposits to perform maturity transformation, transforming
short-term deposits into long term assets. Shadow banks, instead of taking deposits, rely
more on short-term funding such as through repurchasings or repos3, from corporations,
households, or financial institutions (FSB, 2011 and Pozsar et al, 2012). These funds are

3

In a repo, the borrower sells a security today for a price below the current market price on the
understanding that it will buy it back in the future at a pre-agreed price (Adrian and Shin, 2010).
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later transformed into longer-term or less liquid assets such as mortgages. They can also
be re-invested which will raise the leverage that they assume (FSB, 2011). Thus, shadow
banks are subject to risk, especially liquidity risk.
Shadow banks do not have direct access to public sector or central bank backstop
and deposit insurance, such as the Fed’s discount lending window and FDIC deposit
insurance. Shadow banks’ reliance on short-term funding and the lack of public guarantees
cause the shadow banking sector to be more prone to runs (Pozsar et al., 2012).
In term of regulations, the shadow banking system is relatively less regulated. At
the same time, some studies argue that this sector arises in response to changes in banking
regulations. These regulations have put substantial restrictions on traditional banks
inducing them to sometimes exit this sector and operate as a shadow bank in order to find
other profit opportunities (Gorton, 2010). The first essay of this dissertation addressed this
issue which is referred to as regulatory arbitrage. Since shadow banks are subject to less
regulation they are able to increase the returns of investments by leveraging up more. Banks
have an incentive to raise leverage in order to increase their profits (Adrian and Shin, 2009).
This may result in increases in risk in the shadow banking sector.
Liquidity or maturity transformations and leverage build up result in higher risk in
the shadow banking sector. In addition, different characteristics of traditional and shadow
banks may generate differences in risk for the traditional and shadow banking sectors. As
John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000) have argued, all banks will have different investment
opportunity sets and this implies different optimal level of risk. They further argue that the
effectiveness of regulations based on capital ratios may be limited due to the variation in
the investment set. In sum, regulations imposed on one sector may vary the investment
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opportunities available to the other sector, which in turn affect risk levels. Thus, capital
regulations, even if imposed on one sector, may have impacts on both sectors with those
impacts differing across sectors.
Broadly, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) defines the shadow banking system
as “credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking
system” (Financial Stability Board, 2011). In this essay shadow banks are identified as
Non-depository Credit Institutions (code 61) under the Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) system, as in the first essay. In this study, we focus on non-performing loans (NPLs)
and z-score as the measures or proxies of risks. The NPL is an indicator of credit risk while
the z-score is interpreted as the probability of bank insolvency. The existing literature lacks
research on bank risk in the different banking sectors. Thus, this study aims to fill the gap.
The purpose of this study is to empirically examine the impact of risk-based
minimum capital requirements on bank risk outcomes. In addition to the previous research,
however, this study aims to focus on the impacts of minimum capital requirements for
traditional and shadow baking sectors.

Results of the study offer evidence on the

effectiveness of minimum capital requirements implementation and explores how risks
differ in the two banking sectors.
This study uses banking level data from the Orbis database covering 82 countries.
The minimum capital requirement that is used in this study is collected from the Bank
Regulation and Supervision Survey (BRSS) conducted by the World Bank. Data for Basel
II implementation are collected from the Bank for International Settlements. The empirical
evidence indicates that capital regulations, measured by Basel implementation, is
negatively related to risks. In this essay two variables of risk are used, which are the ratio
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of non-performing loans (NPLs) to gross loans as the ex-post risk and z-score as the exante risk. Basel II is effective in reducing both measures of risk. Other results suggest that
traditional and shadow banks differ in term of risks.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review on
capital regulation and bank risk. Section 3 explains the data used in the analysis. Section 4
presents the empirical method. Section 5 presents the results and addresses the endogeneity
of capital regulation and section 6 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
A body of research on the relationship between capital and bank risk has focused
on analyzing capital regulations, bank risk, and banking stability. Most of this previous
research is theoretical in nature. It has generated contradictory conclusions on the
relationship between capital regulations and bank risk-taking and on the effectiveness of
capital regulation in restraining bank risk-taking. Most existing literature examines risktaking behavior for the whole banking system, while this study focus on whether traditional
and shadow banking sector take on different level of risks in response to minimum capital
regulation.
Previous research has reached divergent conclusions regarding the effect of capital
regulations on bank risk-taking. Keeley (1990), Keely and Furlong (1990), Furlong and
Keely (1989), and Kim and Santomero (1988) demonstrate that capital regulation can be
used to reduce bank risk. Kim and Santomero (1988) specifically show that risk-weighted
capital requirements are effective. They argue that risk-based minimum capital requirement
can be used to control bank risks as long as the risk weights are chosen optimally. Based
on their analysis, the weights depends on the expected returns, variance-covariance
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structure of the returns, and the upper bound of insolvency risks allowed by the regulators.
These three factors are observable and the weights are independent of individual bank
preferences, thus risk-weighted capital requirements can be applied.
Keeley (1990) finds that banks with higher capital relative to assets tend to have
lower default probabilities. The empirical findings in his paper support this argument, as
higher capital leads to lower risk using the two indicators employed in this analysis. Keely
and Furlong (1990) and Furlong and Keely (1989) theoretically show that capital regulation
may be able to restrain bank asset risks. These studies examine the effect of more stringent
capital requirements on bank risk taking by incorporating the role of deposit insurance,
hence they only focus on fully insured banks. Furlong and Keely (1989) shows that for
fully insured banks the marginal gain from increasing asset risk is positively related to a
change in leverage. Since a higher capital ratio is equivalent to lower leverage, more
stringent capital regulations lead value-maximizing banks to decrease their asset risk.
To the contrary, other studies have concluded that strengthening capital regulations
encourage banks to take more risks, thus, counteracting the purpose of capital controls.
Koehn and Santomero (1980) suggest that perhaps the mechanism by which this takes place
is that higher minimum capital requirements induce banks to invest in a riskier portfolio of
assets. They further formally show that a uniform capital requirement that does not take
into account the asset quality is not effective in reducing bank risks. Gennotte and Pyle
(1991) incorporate deposit insurance in their study and show that the minimum capital
requirement may be positively related to bank risk. Deposit insurance allows banks to
provide an almost riskless rate on their deposits. Moreover, the deposit guarantee is
basically a transfer from government to banks’ shareholders or customers, thereby
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constituting an additional profit. This profit will be larger for banks that have higher risk
portfolios when those are associated with higher returns. Therefore, to limit the incentive
for banks to take higher risks, capital regulation is introduced. A higher capital requirement
has two effects on the probability of bankruptcy. It reduces leverage, which reduces the
probability of bankruptcy, but it also increases asset risk, which increases the probability
of bankruptcy. The magnitude of these opposing effects depends on the ratio of the
elasticities of the net present value of investment with respect to the mean and variance of
the present value. If the elasticity is independent of the level of assets and if asset returns
follows a lognormal distribution, a higher capital requirement leads to higher asset risk.
A study by Calem and Rob (1999) arrive at different conclusions relative to the two
lines of research outlined above. They suggest that the relationship between capital position
and risk is U-shaped. In contrast to the previous studies, their model incorporate
heterogeneity across banks where banks have realized different capital positions.
Undercapitalized banks take the highest risk and risk declines as capital rises. After a
certain point as capital continue to rise, risk starts to increase. Thus undercapitalized and
well-capitalized banks take on more risk than banks with average capital positions. The
undercapitalized banks assume more risk because deposit insurance will guarantee the bank
in case of bankruptcy while a well-capitalized bank will take on more risk to gain more
profits since their probability of bankruptcy is low. VanHoose (2007) argues that the
variation in the relationship between capital regulation and bank risk taking is on account
of differences in the modeling approach of the different papers. Keeley (1990), Keely and
Furlong (1990), Furlong and Keely (1989), Gennotte and Pyle (1991), and Koehn and
Santomero (1980) use a portfolio-based approach in their analysis. Calem and Rob (1999)
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focus on the incentives regarding the capital regulations. In the next few sections we turn
to our empirical analysis of the effects of capital regulation on traditional and shadow
banks’ risks. We begin by outlining the data in the next section.
3.3 Data
Following Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Fiordelisi et al. (2011), this study uses
non-performing loans (NPLs) to measure risk. NPL is used to measure credit risk and it is
an ex-post risk indicator. In this sense, it does not allow authorities to take preventive
actions in limiting risks. We also work with an ex-ante risk indicator, which is the z-score.
Several papers such as Leaven and Levine (2009) and Kanas (2013) use individual bank zscore as the measure of risk in their studies. To ensure robustness of our results, we utilize
several specifications and different data sets. We use both cross-section and pooled data to
estimate the relationship between capital regulation and risks.
The non-performing loans indicator variable (NP) is constructed using individual
bank data by computing the ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to gross loans. The NPLs
data cover the period 2004-2013. The z-score are constructed using assets, equity, and
return on assets (ROA) over the period of 2003-2012. The z-score is defined as the sum of
the ROA and the equity-asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of ROA. The nonperforming loans, gross loans, assets, equity, and ROA series for each bank are drawn from
Orbis database published by Bureau van Dijk (BvD).
The main explanatory variable is the implementation of Basel II by each country.
Basel II is a set of banking recommendations proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision. The framework focuses on the capital adequacy standard and proposes a risk
based framework for measuring capital adequacy. It incorporates market and operational
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risk in addition to credit risk previously recommended in Basel I. It was first introduced in
2004 while Basel II was introduced in 1998. Basel I requires banks to calculate the
minimum level of capital based on a risk weight for only a few asset categories. Basel II
allows banks to use their own risk measurement model to determine the appropriate
minimum capital. Banks can choose from several approaches to calculate the required
capital.
The data for Basel II implementation are drawn from the Financial Stability
Institute (FSI) survey and Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey (BRSS). The FSI
survey and BRSS are conducted by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the
World Bank respectively. The FSI July 2012 report contains implementation dates of Basel
II, 2.5 and III for 131 countries. Some missing data are supplemented from the BRSS. Basel
III that sets a higher capital requirement than Basel I and II will be fully implemented by
2019. While Basel 2.5 which is introduced in 2009 is proposed as a response to the global
financial crisis. It focuses on revisions of the market risk framework.
Equity data are computed by taking the ratio of total equity to total assets. Revenue
growth is calculated using the log difference of revenues. Total equity, total assets, and
revenue data are collected from the Orbis database. There are several macroeconomic
variables that are included in the empirical models. The stringency and restriction indices
are taken from the Barth et al. (2013) database. Barth et al. (2013) construct these indices
using BRSS surveys. The stringency index measures overall capital stringency and it is
constructed using the response from the BRSS survey. The restriction index is constructed
using the response from the BRSS survey on securities, insurance, and real estate activities.
These index data are not available annually, over the period 2004-2014, and are only
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available for 2005 and 2010. Deposit insurance data are obtained from BRRS. They are the
responses to the following question “Is there an explicit deposit insurance protection
system for commercial banks?” GDP growth and inflation data are obtained from the
World Bank. We use annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on
constant local currency and the annual growth of GDP deflator for inflation.
As in the first essay, traditional and shadow banks are identified according to the
standard industrial classification (SIC) following Acharya et al. (2010). The classification
is based on the Office of Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA). OSHA
categorizes finance, insurance, real estate under division H which is identified as code 6000
through 6799. This broad division is divided into seven categories; depository institutions
(code 6011-6099), non-depository credit institutions (code 6111-6163), Security and
Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, and Service (code 6211-6289), Insurance
Carriers (code 6311-6399), Insurance Agents, Brokers, and Service (6411), Real Estate
(code 6512-6553), Holding and Other Investment Offices (code 6712-6799)
(www.osha.gov).
Adrian and Shin (2010) define the shadow banking sector as the sector that contains
asset-backed security issuers, finance companies, and funding companies according to the
Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds guide. Therefore, based on their approach I define
shadow banks as those that fall under the category non-depository credit institutions (code
6111-6163), whereas I define the traditional banking sector to consist of depository
institutions (code 6011-6099).
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the main regression variables for the year
2010, unless otherwise indicated. The sample consists of 1800 banks from 82 countries.
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Column 4 of Table 1 presents the average of the variables across banks and countries. The
average of NP is 0.05 or 5 percent of total loans are bad loans. Twelve banks have zero NP
and 339 banks have NP above 0.5. Out of 1800 observations, about 82 percent or 1610 are
traditional banks. The average of bank’s z-score is 3.79. This suggests that, on average,
profit has to fall by 3.79 times their standard deviation to deplete bank equity. The average
of Basel is 0.22, which suggests that 22 percent of the countries or 19 countries have
implemented Basel II by 2010.
3.4 Empirical Model
Three empirical models are to be used to determine the effect of capital regulation
on risks. We estimate each model using cross-section and pooled data. The cross-section
regressions use 2011 NP - and all the right hand side variables are 2010 data. The pooled
regressions use two sub-samples of NPLs over 2005-2012 period. In the regression using
the z-score as the dependent variable, the sample covers the period 2003-2012. Because of
the limited data availability for the restriction index, stringency index, and deposit
insurance, some of the regressions do not include these variables. The baseline empirical
model that is estimated is as follows:

(1)
where NP measures bank risk for bank i in country j. We use the ratio of non-performing
loans (NPLs) to gross loan as the measure of bank risk. Basel is the main independent
variable and is indicative of the implementation of Basel II. It is a dummy variable, which
takes the value of 1 if Basel II has been implemented. Rev is revenue growth for bank i
in country j. Depins is a dummy for the availability of deposit insurance in country j. It
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takes on the value 1 if deposit insurance is available and 0 otherwise. String is the index
of capital stringency in country j. The index ranges from 0 to 7 and higher values indicate
greater stringency. Restrict is the index of bank activity restrictions in country j. The index
ranges from 3 to 12, with higher values indicative of greater restrictions. These two indices
are drawn from (Barth et al., 2013), which are constructed from the BRSS survey
conducted by the World Bank. The last two independent variables are GDP growth and
inflation. Equation 1 allows traditional and shadow banks to have different level of nonperforming loans. The coefficient on TB δ

in equation 1 is interpreted as the expected

difference in the incidence of non-performing loans between traditional and shadow banks
holding all other variables constant. The coefficient on Basel β

can be interpreted as the

effect of Basel implementation on the ex-post measure of risk, NP.
The second class of econometric models substitutes an interaction term between
TB and Basel (TB*Basel) in place of the Basel dummy variable. In equation 2 and 3, the
interaction term permits us to examine the impact of Basel across two types of banking
sector. We believe that the impact of Basel depends upon the type of banking sector. TB
in equation 2 reflects the difference of NP between traditional and shadow banking sector.
∗
(2)
The third empirical model includes TB, Basel, and the interaction term. This specification
allows us to see the differential effect of being traditional banks by looking at TB
coefficient and the differential effect of implementing Basel from the Basel coefficient.
∗
(3)
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Another variable to proxy risk that is used is the bank’s z-score. Previous literature,
for example Koehn and Santomero (1980) among others, use the z-score as one measure
of bank insolvency. The z-score is derived by applying the Bienayme-Chebyshev
inequality to find the upper bound of bankruptcy probability (Boyd et al. 1993).
Boyd et al. (1993) define bank bankruptcy as “situation in which equity is insufficient to
offset losses” (p. 48) or m<–E, where m is total accounting income after taxes and E is total
accounting equity. They define

and

. If r is normally distributed, the

probability of bankruptcy can be written as
0,1

where

and

,

are, respectively, the true mean and standard deviation of r distribution

respectively. The upper bound of the probability of bankruptcy is z and by BienaymeChebyshev inequality:
(4)
In this set up z can be interpreted as “the number of standard deviation below mean by
which profit must fall in order to eliminate equity” (p.48).
Bertay, et.al. (2013) interpret the z-score as the probability of insolvency. Bank insolvency
can be defined as (CAR+ROA)<0 (Strobl, 2014), where CAR is the capital asset ratio and
ROA is the return on assets. Rearrange the definition of insolvency we get the following
equation
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By Bienayme-Chebyshev inequality the probability of insolvency can be written as
1

(5)
where

is the mean of ROA and

is the standard deviation ROA. A higher z-score

reflects a lower probability of insolvency. It indicates “the number of standard deviations
that a bank’s rate of return on assets can fall in a single period before it becomes insolvent”
(p.535). The z-score in this paper is defined as following Bertay, et.al. (2013), which is
derived from equation 5
(6)
where

is the mean of equity to asset ratio or leverage.
It has been argued that capital regulation and risks may be endogenous. The capital

regulation basically requires banks to allocate minimum capital to provide a buffer against
bank losses and discourage banks from taking excessive risks. Thus, on the one hand the
amount of capital is dependent on risks while on the other hand, the amount of risks a banks
can take may depend on its level of capital. The empirical models, which includes Basel in
the right hand side, will be endogenous. We address the endogeneity with an instrumental
variable (IV) approach in section 5.1.
3.4.1

Endogeneity
Basel may be endogenous. Basel is endogenous due to reverse causality. Countries

may apply Basel I or II because they observe banks taking on excessive risk and wish to
stop that behavior. The relationship between risk and capital is also hard to identify
because, the level of risk a bank can undertake is affected by its capital level and capital
that is needed is influence the amount of risk that a bank wants to undertake. Thus, Basel
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implementation and risk may be endogenous. Basel II aims to better align minimum capital
requirements with risk. Basel II consists of three pillars, Pillar I outlines the mechanism for
calculating minimum regulatory capital. This first pillar includes calculations for credit risk
and operational risk. Regulatory capital for credit risk can be calculated using the
standardized approach or internal rating based (IRB) approach. The IRB approach allows
institutions to use their internal measures of credit risk. Institutions which use advanced
IRB are allowed to use their own estimates of the borrower’s probability of default (BIS,
2005). Basel is a dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 if the country has implemented
II by a specific year and 0 otherwise. For instrumenting Basel implementation, we are
looking for macroeconomic variables that are related to Basel implementation but are
uncorrelated with the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans (NP). Possible
instruments are a country’s z-score.
National z-score data are taken from Global Financial Development Database
(GFDD) from the World Bank. The z-score is intended to captures the probability of default
of a country's banking system. It compares the buffer of a country's banking system
(capitalization and returns) with the volatility of those returns. It is calculated as
(ROA+(equity/assets))/sd(ROA); sd(ROA) is the standard deviation of return on assets
(ROA). ROA, equity, and assets are country-level aggregate figures. Such aggregate level
data are exogenous to any specific banks, thus any specific bank’s NP. However, it has a
very close relationship with Basel I or II implementation because the z-score is an indicator
of probability of default of a country's banking system, thus the higher the probability of
default the more likely a country will implement Basel I or II. Financial system deposit
measures the depth of financial system. It is the total value of demand, time and saving
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deposits at domestic deposit money banks as a share of GDP. Deposit money banks
comprise commercial banks and other financial institutions that accept transferable
deposits, such as demand deposits.
Revenue growth and equity are endogenous because of reverse causality. The
causal relationship can go in both directions. NP, equity, and revenue growth are some
bank performance indicators. Banks with higher equity and revenue growth tend to have
lower NP and vice versa. It is not clear whether low NP lead to higher equity and revenue
growth or the opposite. It is possible that NP affects equity and revenue growth rather than
the other way around. That is, high revenue growth and equity may induce banks to do
more monitoring of their clients and select less risky customers, which ultimately reduces
the probability of loan defaults. On the other hand, low levels of NP may lead to higher
revenue growth of banks. Common factors may affect all of these three variables at the
same time, such as business cycles or other macroeconomic shocks. To account for the
impact of these factors we included two macroeconomic indicators, inflation and GDP
growth, as explanatory variables.
Two separate solutions to deal with the endogeneity problem of Basel
implementation are to use simultaneous equation and instrumental variable (IV) approach.
Equation that suffer from reverse causality can be fixed using simultaneous equation
method, however this method requires the system of the equation to be exactly identified.
The second method requires good instruments for Basel implementation.
This essay utilizes instrumental variable (IV) approach to deal with the endogeneity
of Basel implementation. As suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2009), multiple
endogenous variables in one regression equation are difficult to identify and the results are
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also hard to interpret. Thus, we start with an equation and assume it only contains one
endogenous variable at a time. First, we analyze an equation that contains Basel
implementation as the endogenous variable, next we consider the interaction between Basel
implementation and TB as the endogenous variable.
The second concern of the instrumental variable (IV) approach is that the
endogenous variable, Basel implementation, is a categorical variable. It takes the value of
1 if a specific country has implemented Basel II at a certain year and it take the value of 0
if otherwise. The instrument, on the other hand, the national level z-score, is a continuous
variable. We follow procedures as suggested by Wooldridge (2002) to deal with this type
of endogenous variable. He suggests using the method to estimate the average treatment
effect (ATE) using IV. Heckman (1978) refers to it as a dummy endogenous variable
model. The model can be written as follows
(7)
x is the vector of covariates, w is binary treatment indicator, where w=1 denotes treatment
and w=0 otherwise, and

is the average treatment effect (ATE). This equation can be

estimated using 2 stage least squares (2SLS) method. Based on Wooldridge (2002), the
optimal IV for w is
where

| ,

, ;

, therefore a two-step IV procedure can be used,
1| ,

is the vector of instruments. First, estimate model

using maximum likelihood and calculate the fitted probabilities

, ;

. Second, estimate

equation (8) using instrumental variable (IV) method using instruments 1,

, and

.

Wooldridge (2002) shows that 2SLS estimators and standards errors are asymptotically
valid, and IV estimator are asymptotically efficient in the class of estimator where IVs are
function of

,

, as long as

|

is linear in x, the error
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has zero conditional mean

or

| ,

0, and

| ,

is constant. In our case, the first stage will be

regressing Basel implementation on national level z-score as the instrument and all the
explanatory variables. The second stage, use the predicted probability after the probit
regression from the first stage by IV and use the predicted probability from the first stage
and other control as the instrument to estimate the NP equation (equation 1, 2, or 3).
Overall, the results shows that some of the least squares estimates differ from the
IV estimates. Some estimates that are significant in the least squares regressions become
not significant in the IV regressions and vice versa. The I.V. regression results are
presented in Table 2 to Table 5 in columns 4 to 6 In column 4 Basel is instrumented by
national level z-score, in column 5 the interaction term, TB*Basel, is instrumented with
the interaction between TB and national level z-score, and in column 6 Basel and the
interaction term are instrumented by national level z-score and the interaction between TB
and national level z-score.
3.5 Results
The regression results are presented in Table 2 through Table 5. The ratio of Nonperforming loans to gross loans (NP) and individual bank z-scores are used as alternative
measures of risk. The numbers in the parentheses are P-values. The least square method is
used to estimate the impact of capital requirement implementation on bank risk. To deal
with the presence of endogeneity, the instrumental variable (IV) approached is used. All
the standard errors from the IV method have been corrected (as robust standard errors).
The second way to minimize potential endogeneity is by using the lag values of the
independent variables. We incorporate the lag independent variable method as shown in
Table 2 to 4. Non-performing loans (NP) and z-score are used as the proxies of risks.
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Table 2 shows the regression result using cross-sectional data. The dependent
variable is non-performing loans (NP) in 2011 and all the independent variables use 2010
data to minimize the potential endogeneity. The independent variables in the regression are
as follows. TB is a dummy variable and it takes the value of 1 for traditional banks and 0
otherwise. Basel is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the country applied Basel II
by the year 2010 and 0 otherwise. Equity is the ratio of equity to total assets. The other
control variables are revenue growth, deposit insurance, stringency index, restriction index,
GDP growth, and inflation. Column 2, 3, 5, and 6 in Table 2 includes interaction terms
between TB and Basel.
In the first column of Table2 (without interaction terms), Basel is negative and
significant at the 1% level. It indicates that banks in countries that implement Basel II by
the year 2010 experienced less ex-post risk as shown by lower NP. Revenue growth, bank’s
activity restriction index, and deposit insurance are negatively correlated with NP, as
expected. Equity is positively correlated with NP. Ogler and Taggart (1983) argue that
banks optimize their capital by evaluating the benefit from debt financing (because
interests are tax deductible) and the cost associated with it (higher debts increases
bankruptcy costs). The value of bankruptcy costs is an increasing function of the
probability of bankruptcy. Therefore, banks tend to increase capital level when they
increase asset portfolio risks. This relationship is relevant for banks with capital positions
higher than required by the regulation. As capital is closely related to equity4, we may
argue that equity will also be positively related to risks. Since tax regulations vary across
countries, this channel is only true for some countries. Other explanation for this is agency

4

Equity is equal to capital if capital is defined as total asset minus liabilities (tier 1 capital).
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theory (Saunders et al., 1990). In this context, managers act as agents of the stockholders.
Managers lose a great deal in the event of bank insolvency, consequently they have the
incentive to take risks below the level desired by the stockholders. As a result, for banks
with high risk, the managers will compensate by setting higher capital.
Deposit insurance has a negative impact on NP suggesting that deposit insurance
does not seem to encourage banks to take excessive risks. Some have argued that insurance
can be considered as a downfall gain for the banks, as a result it leads banks to undertake
inefficient investment and thus increases risks (Gennotte and Pyle, 1991). However, Keely
and Furlong (1990) argue that one of the objectives of capital regulation is to reduce risk
induced by the deposit insurance. They further show that capital regulation is effective in
limiting risk even in the presence of deposit insurance. Inflation is positively correlated
with NP indicating that higher inflation is associated with higher NP. Higher inflation may
result in an unfavorable economic environment causing banks’ customers to have
difficulties in meeting their repayment to the banks.
The second column of Table 2 shows that NP is 2.58 percentage points lower under
Basel II for traditional banks. TB and the interaction term of TB and Basel are jointly
significant at 1% level. The third column of Table 2 includes the interaction terms. Using
column 3 of Table 2, the effect of Basel on NP is 0.0514-0.0766=-0.0252 suggesting that
Basel leads to lower NP in traditional banks by 2.5 percentage points, while increases NP
by 5.1 percentage points in the shadow banking sector..
Tables 3 and 4 estimate the regression results using pooled data. The results in
Table 3 use 2-period pooled data of NP in 2006 and 2011. We only use 2006 and 2011
sample because of data availability of the explanatory variables. The specification in Table
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3 uses the same explanatory variables as in Table 2. Table 4 uses 8-period pooled data, the
dependent variable is NP from 2005-2012 and all the explanatory variables are from 20042011. Since the deposit insurance, restriction index, and stringency index are not available
for every year, these indices are not included in this specification.
Table 5 shows the regression results where the dependent variable is the individual
bank z-score. The z-score requires using the mean and standard deviation of ROA. Thus,
the z-score is constructed using data over the period 2004-2007 and 2008-2012. The zscore can be interpreted as the probability of default over the period 2004-2007 and 20082012 or how far bank’s rate of return on assets can fall before it becomes insolvent. For the
explanatory variables (equity, revenue growth, GDP growth, and inflation) we use 2004
and 2008 data since the impacts of these variables on the probability of default might take
time before they become effective. We use 2001 and 2005 data for deposit insurance,
stringency index, and restriction index because these variables are only available for 2001
and 2005 during the regression period. Table 5 column 1 and 3 shows that traditional banks
have higher z-score, which suggest a lower probability of default relative to the shadow
banks. In column 2 Basel is positive suggesting that Basel implementation leads to higher
z- score or lower probability of default.
The following section will discuss the IV estimates. Table 2 to 4 present regression
results using NP as the proxy of risks. Column 4 of Table 2 shows that Basel reduces NP
by 0.2047 relative to NP of banks in countries that have not implemented Basel. Similarly,
the results in column 5 of Table 2 also suggest that the implementation of Basel reduces
NP in the traditional banking sector by 0.1107 or by 11.07 percentage points relative to the
NP of the shadow banks.
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The IV estimates in column 4 in Table 3 suggest that we expect to see 0.0153 more
NP in traditional than in the shadow banking sector. Using the same column, Basel leads
to lower risk, which is measured by the NP, by 0.2031. Similar to this results, column 5
suggests that Basel implementation in traditional banking system leads 0.1703 lower risk
in traditional banking sector. Table 4 column 4 and 5 also suggest similar results.
Column 6 of Table 3 and column 6 of Table 4 allow us to compare the NP of
traditional banks which implement Basel to those which do not. Using column 6 of Table
3, the effect of Basel on traditional banks is -0.310, calculated as -0.0794-0.956+0.7253,
while the effect for traditional banks that do not implement Basel is -0.0794. Using column
6 of Table 4, the effect of Basel on traditional banks is -0.0881, calculated as -0.12241.003+0.7927, while the effect for traditional banks that do not implement Basel is -0.1224.
Therefore, the results from Table 3 suggest that in traditional banking sector, Basel leads
to lower NP while Table 4 suggest otherwise.
The results using bank z-score as the proxy for risk are presented in Table 5. In
column 4, where the interaction term is not included, Basel increases z-score by 7.5382.
This suggests that Basel implementation reduces the probability of bank default.
Traditional banks tend to have higher z-score by 0.567 or lower probability of default
relative to the shadow banks. As discussed the previous section, z-score is an ex-ante risk
indicator while NP is more of an ex-post risk indicator. Column 5 of Table 5 also suggest
similar results, the z-score for traditional bank 5.2169 higher in response to Basel
implementation.
After estimating the IV regressions we test if the endogenous variables are actually
exogenous. We test the hypothesis using the Durbin and Wu-Hausman test. The null
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hypothesis is that the variables are exogeneous. The results indicates that all the variables
that are assumed to be endogenous are indeed endogeneous in all regression specifications5.
3.6 Conclusions
Capital provides a cushion to absorb unexpected loss or risk for banks so that they
can continue their operation. Basel I, II, and III are a set of capital regulation proposed by
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to set an international standard on capital
adequacy. Basel I was introduced in 1988 and focuses only on credit risk. The first accord
was then revised to take into account the new developments in the banking sector. Basel II
incorporate more risk categories to better align with the actual bank portfolio. Previous
literature highlights that the impact of capital regulation is mixed, that capital may or may
not be effective in limiting bank risk. Other development in the banking sector in the last
decade is the emergence of shadow banking sectors. This sector is believed to have
significantly contributed to the 2009 financial crisis and is associated with systemic risk.
This paper examines the effect of Basel II on bank risks in the traditional and shadow
banking sectors.
In this paper we examine the impact of Basel II implementation on bank’s ex-post
and ex-ante risk indicators. The ex-post risk indicator that is used is the ratio of nonperforming loans to gross loans (NP) and the ex-ante risk indicators used is bank’s z-score.
We find that Basel II induces lower risks, as measured by NP and z-scores. It leads to lower
NP and higher z-scores (signifying a lower probability of bank default). Comparing the
two banking sectors, the results are mixed. Using NP as the measure of risk, traditional

5

The null hypothesis is that the variable is exogenous. The test results indicate that all of the pvalues are less or equal to 0.01 or we reject that the variables are exogenous.
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banks tend to have higher level of NP, or higher risk, relative to the shadow banks.
However, using z-score as the risk measure the results shows that traditional banks tend to
have lower probability of default, or lower risk, relative to the shadow banks.
In sum, the two banking sectors exhibit different risk profiles. Traditional banking
sector tends to have lower ex-ante risk while it has higher ex-post risk relative to the
shadow baking sector. Nevertheless, Basel II implementation is effective in reducing both
ex-post and ex-ante risk in the traditional banking sector.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics (for the year 2010)
Variable

Unit
(1)

Bank level
Non-performing loans*
TB
Equity
Revenue growth
Bank z-score**
Country level
Basel
Restriction index
Stringency index
Deposit insurance
Inflation
GDP growth
Country z-score

No. of
observation
(2)

Ratio
Ratio
Percent

Percent
Percent

Mean

Min

Max

(4)

Std.
Dev.
(5)

(6)

(7)

1800
1800
1800
1800
13908

0.05
0.89
0.16
0.04
3.78

0.08
0.31
0.14
0.64
6.94

0
0
0.001
-5.39
-431.88

0.94
1
0.99
3.85
185.84

82
82
82
82
82
82
80

0.22
6.95
5.18
0.83
6.86
3.83
15.79

0.42
1.92
1.51
0.38
12.64
3.82
11.72

0
3
2
0
-2.32
-9.53
-2.61

1
12
7
1
102.33
16.73
46.35

*Non-performing loans 2011
**Bank's z-score over 2008-2012
This table reports descriptive statistics of the main regression variables. Statistics based on annual data for
the year 2010, unless otherwise indicated. Sample consist of 1760 banks from 76 countries, if available. Nonperforming loans (NP) is computed as the bank’s ratio of on total non-performing loans to total gross loans.
TB is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bank is a traditional bank and 0 if it shadow bank. Equity
is the ratio of total equity total assets. Revenue growth is the annual growth of total revenues of the banks.
Bank z-score is the bank’s return on assets (ROA) plus the capital asset ratio (CAR) divided by the standard
deviation of ROA over the period 2008-2012. Basel is a dummy variable that it takes a value of 1 if the
country has implemented Basel by 2010 and 0 otherwise. Restriction index is an index of activity restriction.
Stringency index is an index of capital stringency. Deposit insurance is a dummy variable that it takes a value
of 1 if the country has the explicit deposit insurance and zero otherwise. Inflation is the annual growth of
GDP deflator. GDP growth is annual growth of GDP. Country z-score is the country’s z-score.
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Table 3.2: Least Squares and Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates of Basel on NP: Cross-section
Method: least squares

TB
Basel

2

3

4

5

6

NP2011

NP2011

NP2011

NP2011

NP2011

NP2011

-0.0048

-0.0013

0.0058

-0.0061

-0.291

(0.409)

(0.829)

(0.351)

(0.421)

(0.445)

-0.0162

0.0514

-0.2047

-2.5655

(0.004)***

(0.001)***

(0.000)***

(0.429)

TB*Basel
Equity
Revenue
growth
Deposit
insurance
Stringency
index
Restriction
index
GDP growth
Inflation
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Method: IV 2SLS

1

-0.0258

-0.0766

-0.1107

1.9721

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.453)

0.1682

0.1654

0.164

0.134

0.1137

0.1114

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.195)

-0.0161

-0.0159

-0.0161

-0.0095

-0.0125

0.0115

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.021)**

(0.000)***

(0.739)

-0.0199

-0.0222

-0.0192

-0.0941

-0.0511

-0.3622

(0.011)**

(0.004)***

(0.013)**

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.366)

-0.0004

-0.0004

-0.0007

0.0025

-0.0003

0.0207

(0.775

(0.784)

(0.641)

(0.25)

(0.869)

(0.445)

-0.0069

-0.0071

-0.0069

-0.0131

-0.0107

-0.0341

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.289)

-0.0005

-0.0005

-0.0005

-0.0003

-0.0001

0.0009

(0.507)

(0.508)

(0.492)

(0.775)

(0.911)

(0.824)

0.0005

0.0005

0.0005

0.0004

0.0005

-0.0002

(0.022)**

(0.022)**

(0.020)**

(0.191)

(0.029)**

(0.864)

0.1017

0.1035

0.0939

0.229

0.1708

0.8615

(0.000)***
1,800

(0.000)***
1,800

(0.000)***
1,800

Observations

(0.000)***
1,777

(0.000)***
1,591

(0.347)
1,777

0.18

0.19

0.19

Instrumented:

Basel

TB*Basel

Instruments:

z-score
(national)

TB*z-score
(national)

Basel,
TB*Basel
z-score,
TB*z-score
(national)

p-values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant
at 1%

This table presents regression results of indicators of bank risk (non-performing loans) on capital regulation
(Basel) and other bank-specific and macroeconomic variables. Column 1 to 3 present the results using least
square method and column 4 to 6 present the results using instrumental variable (IV) method. The dependent
variable is non-performing loans 2011 and all the independent variables are for the year 2010. Dependent
variable is non-performing loans (NP), computed as the bank’s ratio of on total non-performing loans to total
gross loans. TB is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bank is a traditional bank and 0 if it shadow
bank. Basel is a dummy variable that it takes a value of 1 if the country has implemented Basel by 2010 and
0 otherwise. TB*Basel is the interaction between TB and Basel. Equity is the ratio of total equity total assets.
Revenue growth is the annual growth of total revenues of the banks. Deposit insurance is a dummy variable
that it takes a value of 1 if the country has the explicit deposit insurance and zero otherwise. Stringency index
is an index of capital stringency. Restriction index is an index of activity restriction. GDP growth is annual
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growth of GDP. Inflation is the annual growth of GDP deflator. Z-score is the country’s z-score (national
level z-score). TB*z-score is the interaction between TB and country z-score.
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Table 3.3: Least Squares and Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates of Basel on NP: Pooled 2-period
Method: least squares

TB
Basel

Method: IV 2SLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

NP

NP

NP

NP

NP

NP

0.0004

0.0032

0.0091

0.0004

-0.0794

(0.917)

(0.392)

(0.018)**

(0.913)

(0.083)*

0.0553

-0.1311

-0.956

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

-0.015
(0.000)***

TB*Basel
Equity
Revenue
growth
Deposit
insurance
Stringency
index
Restriction
index
GDP growth
Inflation
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(0.049)**

-0.025

-0.0798

-0.0833

0.7253

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.078)*

0.1684

0.1661

0.1645

0.1538

0.1331

0.1615

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

-0.0174

-0.0172

-0.0174

-0.014

-0.015

-0.0083

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.127)

-0.0231

-0.025

-0.0223

-0.0583

-0.0385

-0.1228

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.005)***

0.0003

0.0004

0.0001

0.0024

0.0011

0.0076

(0.713)

(0.654)

(0.873)

(0.026)**

(0.273)

(0.043)**

-0.0059

-0.0061

-0.006

-0.0092

-0.0088

-0.0144

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

-0.0008

-0.0008

-0.0008

-0.0007

-0.0005

-0.0004

(0.11)

(0.108)

(0.099)*

(0.181)

(0.334)

(0.686)

0.0007

0.0007

0.0007

0.0007

0.0008

0.0007

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.015)**

0.0879

0.0895

0.0814

0.1477

0.1297

0.3044

(0.000)***
4,018

(0.000)***
4,018

(0.000)***
4,018

Observations

(0.000)***
3,991

(0.000)***
3,510

(0.002)***
3,991

0.17

0.17

0.18

Instrumented:

Basel

TB*Basel

Instruments:

z-score
(national)

TB*zscore(national)

Basel,
TB*Basel
z-score,
TB*z-score
(national)

p-values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant
at 1%

This table presents regression results of indicators of bank risk (non-performing loans) on capital regulation
(Basel) and other bank-specific and macroeconomic variables. Column 1 to 3 present the results using least
square method and column 4 to 6 present the results using instrumental variable (IV) method. The dependent
variable is non-performing loans 2006 and 2011. The independent variables that are used are for the year
2005 and 2010. Dependent variable is non-performing loans (NP), computed as the bank’s ratio of on total
non-performing loans to total gross loans. TB is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bank is a
traditional bank and 0 if it shadow bank. Basel is a dummy variable that it takes a value of 1 if the country
has implemented Basel and 0 otherwise. TB*Basel is the interaction between TB and Basel. Equity is the
ratio of total equity total assets. Revenue growth is the annual growth of total revenues of the banks. Deposit
insurance is a dummy variable that it takes a value of 1 if the country has the explicit deposit insurance and
zero otherwise. Stringency index is an index of capital stringency. Restriction index is an index of activity
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restriction. GDP growth is annual growth of GDP. Inflation is the annual growth of GDP deflator. Z-score is
the country’s z-score (national level z-score). TB*z-score is the interaction between TB and country z-score.
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Table 3.4: Least Squares and Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates of Basel on NP: Pooled 8-period
Method: least squares
1
TB
Basel

Method: IV 2SLS
2

GDP growth
Inflation
Constant
Observations
R-squared

5

6

NP

NP

NP

NP

NP

-0.0008

0.0002

0.0024

0.0153

-0.1224

(0.204)

(0.732)

(0.001)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

0.0124

-0.2031

-1.0032

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

-0.0032
(0.000)***

Revenue
growth

4

NP

TB*Basel
Equity

3

(0.000)***

-0.0052

-0.0176

-0.1703

0.7927

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

0.1568

0.1568

0.1568

0.1552

0.1402

0.1541

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

-0.0106

-0.0107

-0.0106

-0.0277

-0.0248

-0.0319

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

-0.0014

-0.0014

-0.0014

-0.0011

-0.0013

-0.0013

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

0.002

0.002

0.002

0.0022

0.0025

0.0023

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

0.0195

0.0189

0.0167

0.0547

0.0622

0.1957

(0.000)***
88,112

(0.000)***
88,112

(0.000)***
88,112

Observations

(0.000)***
87,759

(0.000)***
75,756

(0.000)***
87,759

0.14

0.14

0.14

Instrumented:

Basel

TB*Basel

Instruments:

z-score
(national)

TB*zscore(national)

Basel,
TB*Basel
z-score,
TB*z-score
(national)

p-values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant
at 1%

This table presents regression results of indicators of bank risk (non-performing loans) on capital regulation
(Basel) and other bank-specific and macroeconomic variables. Column 1 to 3 present the results using least
square method and column 4 to 6 present the results using instrumental variable (IV) method. The dependent
variable is non-performing loans from the year 2005 to 2012. The independent variables that are used are
from the year 2004 -2011. Dependent variable is non-performing loans (NP), computed as the bank’s ratio
of on total non-performing loans to total gross loans. TB is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the
bank is a traditional bank and 0 if it shadow bank. Basel is a dummy variable that it takes a value of 1 if the
country has implemented Basel and 0 otherwise. TB*Basel is the interaction between TB and Basel. Equity
is the ratio of total equity total assets. Revenue growth is the annual growth of total revenues of the banks.
GDP growth is annual growth of GDP. Inflation is the annual growth of GDP deflator. Z-score is the
country’s z-score (national level z-score). TB*z-score is the interaction between TB and country z-score.
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Table 3.5: Least Squares and Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates of Basel on Z-score
Method: least squares

TB
Basel

1
Bank zscore
0.4754
(0.065)*
1.1024
(0.052)*

4
Bank zscore
0.567
(0.030)**
7.5382
(0.001)***

-1.2291
(0.027)**

1.3372
(0.037)**
-1.2159
(0.028)**

3
Bank zscore
0.4339
(0.099)*
0.2991
(0.794)
1.0438
(0.42)
-1.2182
(0.028)**

-1.1627
(0.037)**

5.2169
(0.013)**
-1.5004
(0.020)**

6
Bank zscore
0.7622
(0.015)**
11.4849
(0.011)**
-4.9736
(0.231)
-1.2161
(0.030)**

0.8359
(0.000)***

0.8291
(0.000)***

0.8307
(0.000)***

0.8464
(0.000)***

0.9903
(0.000)***

0.8717
(0.000)***

-0.0787
(0.835)

-0.08
(0.833)

-0.0771
(0.839)

0.2314
(0.562)

0.1811
(0.701)

0.2321
(0.561)

-0.0708
(0.343)

-0.0729
(0.33

-0.0729
(0.33)

-0.1183
(0.125)

-0.1197
(0.176)

-0.1091
(0.157)

-0.1361
(0.003)***
0.1313
(0.001)***
-0.0843
(0.001)***
4.8995
(0.000)***
13,908
0.0051

-0.136
(0.003)***
0.129
(0.002)***
-0.0836
(0.001)***
4.9608
(0.000)***
13,908
0.0051

-0.1363
(0.003)***
0.1293
(0.002)***
-0.0842
(0.001)***
4.9488
(0.000)***
13,908
0.0051

-0.1673
(0.000)***
0.112
(0.008)***
-0.1374
(0.000)***
5.0265
(0.000)***
13,895
Basel

-0.1483
(0.004)***
0.1279
(0.007)***
-0.1348
(0.000)***
5.5486
(0.000)***
13,047
TB*Basel

z-score
(national)

TB*zscore(national)

-0.1664
(0.000)***
0.1215
(0.004)***
-0.139
(0.000)***
4.7925
(0.000)***
13,895
Basel,
TB*Basel
z-score,
TB*z-score
(national)

TB*Basel
Equity
Revenue
growth
Deposit
insurance
Stringency
index
Restriction
index
GDP growth
Inflation
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Method: IV 2SLS
2
Bank zscore
0.4211
(0.103)

p-values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%

Observations
Instrumented:
Instruments:

5
Bank z-score

This table presents regression results of indicators of bank risk (bank’s z-score) on capital regulation (Basel) and
other bank-specific and macroeconomic variables. Column 1 to 3 present the results using least square method
and column 4 to 6 present the results using instrumental variable (IV) method. The dependent variable is bank’s
z-score, computed as the bank’s return on assets (ROA) plus the capital asset ratio (CAR) divided by the standard
deviation of ROA over the period 2003-2007 and 2008-2012. The independent variables that are used are for
the year 2004 and 2007 for Basel, equity, revenue growth, GDP growth, inflation and 2001 and 2005 for deposit
insurance, stringency, and restriction. The dependent variables are TB is a dummy variable that takes a value of
1 if the bank is a traditional bank and 0 if it shadow bank. Basel is a dummy variable that it takes a value of 1 if
the country has implemented Basel and 0 otherwise. TB*Basel is the interaction between TB and Basel. Equity
is the ratio of total equity total assets. Revenue growth is the annual growth of total revenues of the banks.
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Deposit insurance is a dummy variable that it takes a value of 1 if the country has the explicit deposit insurance
and zero otherwise. Stringency index is an index of capital stringency. Restriction index is an index of activity
restriction. GDP growth is annual growth of GDP. Inflation is the annual growth of GDP deflator. Z-score is the
country’s z-score (national level z-score). TB*z-score is the interaction between TB and country z-score.
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CHAPTER 4
BANK LEVERAGE AND ASSET POSITIONS: CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE
4.1 Introduction
A number of studies in the economics literature have argued that financial systems
are cyclical in nature. In addition to their own cyclical pattern, several studies also conclude
that the financial system is pro-cyclical. By this we mean that the financial cyclicality
interacts with the overall economy amplifying the business cycle. Adrian and Shin (2014)
argue that we can expect lending to be higher during economic expansions and lower
during contractions as more projects are needed to be funded in the boom than in the bust.
Therefore, pro-cyclicality in this context refers to when the variation of lending is greater
than the value of the projects during the expansions and it is lower than the value of the
projects during the contractions (Adrian and Shin 2014 and Arjani, 2011).
According to Adrian and Shin (2010) the cyclicality of the banking sector results
from how banks manage their leverage in response to different economic conditions.
Adrian and Shin (2014) show that banks tend to keep enough equity such that the
probability of default is at a constant value, say α. Risk levels vary over the business cycle,
therefore in order to keep the probability of failure at α , banks need to expand and contract
their balance sheets which implies changing the leverage. Specifically, banks decrease
asset exposure when economic conditions become more risky while increasing asset
exposure when conditions are less risky.
Adrian and Shin (2010) show that the risk levels, which vary over the business
cycle, can be reflected by Value-at-Risk (VaR). In this context, VaR is the approximate
worst case loss or the equity capital that the banks must hold in order to stay solvent with
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some probability. Over the cycle, banks adjust their balance sheets by changing their capital
holding in order to maintain a targeted VaR. To maintain a certain level of VaR, banks
reduce their leverage during contractions while raising it in expansions. To examine the
pro-cyclicality, Adrian and Shin (2010) regress leverage growth on asset growth. Leverage
is pro-cyclical if the coefficient of asset growth is positive. Empirically, Adrian and Shin
examine the relationship between asset and leverage growth using the five largest U.S.
investment banks. They find that leverage growth is positively correlated with assets
growth that is, leverage is pro-cyclical for these investment banks. In contrast, they find
the leverage of households and non-financial firms are not pro-cyclical. Laux and Rauter
(2014) also find strong pro-cyclicality in the U.S. commercial and saving banks.
The positive relationship between assets and leverage growth implies that leverage
is pro-cyclical. During expansion, the demand for banks’ asset increases and banks adjust
their leverage upward. As Adrian and Shin (2013) have shown, over the business cycle,
banks adjust their leverage and treat equity as constant. Therefore, when equity is fixed,
variation in leverage is associated with variation in assets. In the upturn, assets increase
and banks will increase their leverage. The mechanism works in reverse, in downturns
assets decrease and banks engage in deleveraging. Therefore, the relationship between the
growth in asset and leverage is positive.
In addition to the banks reacting to the economic circumstances, bank regulation,
particularly risk-based capital requirements, have been argued to amplify business cycle
fluctuations (Kashyap and Stein, 2004 and Andersen, 2011). The European Banking
Authority (EBA) report for 2013 defines a pro-cyclical capital requirement regulation as a
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regulation that tends to amplify business cycle fluctuations and causes or exacerbates
financial instability.
In general the capital requirement regulations that the financial system regulators
impose tend to be pro-cyclical. They require higher capital holdings in bad times and lower
capital holdings in good times. Thus, in a recession this so-called risk-based capital
standard requires greater capital while the banks’ capital position is weak in this state. The
higher capital requirements lead banks to reduce their lending (Andersen, 2011) and
deleverage during recession. As argued by Adrian and Shin (2010), financial
intermediaries’ leverage varies over the business cycle while equity is kept fixed. The
widespread reduction of lending and deleveraging will aggravate the initial downturn.
Conversely, in the upturn the risk-based capital standard leads to lower risk-weighting.
Banks have surplus capital during the upturn, which lead banks to lend more and increase
their leverage. Therefore, the risk-based capital requirements amplify the cyclicality of the
overall economy.
Several studies have examined the impact of Basel accords, an agreement that
imposes risk-based capital requirements, on the business cycle. Egert and Sutherland
(2012) argue that Basel I leads to banking sector pro-cyclicality because it requires a
relatively high (8%) capital adequacy ratio6. During the downturn, banks will lend less to
meet the requirement. Unlike Basel I, which applies the same capital standard across
different types of assets of financial institutions, Basel II specifies the risk to be tied to
specific types of assets7. Kashyap and Stein (2004) along with Andersen (2011) argue that
6

A measure of a bank's capital expressed as a percentage of its risk weighted credit exposures.
The first pillar of Basel II sets out the method to calculate minimum regulatory capital. Banks
have three options to calculate credit risk. The simplest option is the standardized approach. Under

7
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Basel II tends to strengthen pro-cyclicality based on their theoretical arguments. However,
as Egert and Sutherland note this argument has not been tested. The purpose of this study
is to empirically examine the effect of Basel II on leverage growth and pro-cyliclicality.
In order to test the hypothesis we collect bank data and the implementation of Basel
II from 111 countries. The Basel II implementation data are drawn from Bank for
International Settlements (BIS). Our data cover the period of 2004-2011 and coincide with
Basel II adoption. From the analysis we should be able to dissent the effect of Basel II on
leverage pro-cyclicality.
The results indicate that Basel II increases leverage growth and that leverage is procyclical. We also found that Basel II accords indeed increases the pro-cyclicality. These
results conform to the findings suggested by Kashyap and Stein (2004) and Andersen
(2011).
The essay is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review on the business
cycle and bank leverage. Section 3 explains the data. Section 4 and 5 present the empirical
method and results. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
A number of studies have linked the business cycle with bank behavior. Nuno and
Thomas (2013) examine the cyclical fluctuation in the U.S. banking industry. They show
there exists ‘bank leverage cycles’ where bank leverage, assets, and GDP move together.
The main findings of their studies are i) leverage, equity capital and total assets are more

this approach, assets are grouped according to their risk categories. For example the risk weight of
these categories: loans to sovereigns, corporates and banks are determined by the external credit
ratings agencies (BIS). Under Basel I each categories carries a fixed risk weighting.
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volatile than GDP and ii) leverage is positively correlated to assets and also positively
correlated to GDP. Egert and Sutherland (2012) use data from OECD countries, and show
that the banking system started to synchronize with the real economic cycle in the 1970s.
They conclude that Basel I leads to banking sector pro-cyclicality but they argue that the
impact of Basel II is unknown. They found that the leverage ratio is negatively related to
lending growth and tier 1 ratio, a measure of capital adequacy, is also negatively related to
lending growth. The negative co-movement between lending growth and banks’ capital is
also observed for different types of banks: commercial, investment, mortgage, saving, and
co-operative banks.
One economic indicator that is widely used in relation to banking pro-cyclicality is
the supply of credit. Bernanke and Lown (1991) have documented that one of the impacts
of Basel I is a reduction in lending. Ivashina and Scarfstein (2010) use the U.S. banking
industry and show that all types of lending fell during the financial crisis in 2008. The
reduction of lending can be decomposed into demand and supply reductions. The drop of
lending is a results of a drop in demand of credit by firms or it may be because of a supply
effect; banks that are less capitalized and have riskier credit-lines will cut back their lending
by a greater amount in comparison to other banks.
Adrian and Shin (2010) and Adrian and Shin (2013) argue that bank leverage is
pro-cyclical. The pro-cyclicality reflects active balance sheet management where leverage
is adjusted to the economic environment. When asset prices increase during the expansion
period, banks’ balance sheets get stronger permitting banks to hold more capital. The
excess capital encourages banks to expand their balance sheets. The pro-cyclicality is
analyzed using plots of asset and leverage and regressions of leverage on total asset (Adrian
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and Shin, 2010). Adrian and Shin (2013) further incorporate the implication of this procyclicality on the supply of credit. Risk varies over the cycle and it is at the highest level
during the downturn. To reduce the risk banks withdraw their lending in a recession, thus
magnifying the downturn.
In terms of bank capital regulations Andersen (2011) and Arjani (2011) argue that
Basel II may increase pro-cyclicality in the banking sector. Basel II, which is basically a
risk-based capital requirement, calls for higher capital in periods of recessions when banks’
capital is at the lowest level. The higher capital requirement encourages banks to reduce
their lending and thus further worsens the recession. The reverse mechanism works during
the economic expansion. Basel II requires less capital because risk is lower in the upturn.
Banks have excess capital and find a way to employ the excess capital by lending more.
Arjani points out several methods that are designated to counter the pro-cyclicality in Basel
II. First is to use the Advanced Internal Rating-Based (AIRB) approach to calculate the
“loss-given-default at levels likely to prevail during an economic downturn”. Under Pillar
I of Basel II, there are three options to calculate the credit-risk-weighted value to certain
assets, the Standardized approach, the Foundation Internal Rating-Based (FIRB), and the
Advanced Internal Rating-Based (AIRB) approach. Second, in order to smooth out default
risk estimates over the cycle, it is suggested to use “through-the-cycle” instead of “pointin-time” estimates to calculate the probability of default (PD). The third Basel accords,
Basel III incorporates measures to reduce the sensitivity of capital requirements to the
business cycle (Repullo and Suarez, 2013).
Repullo (2013) highlights the trade-off that takes place concerning the risk-based
capital requirements. On the one hand, when the economy is contracting, Basel II requires
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more capital and hence leads to a reduction in lending and worsens the recession. On the
other, if we want to lessen the impact of the crisis by lowering the capital requirements,
banks will assume greater risks. Thus, by setting higher capital requirements, the social
cost of bank failure is lower but this will decrease aggregate investment and lending.
Repullo (2013) shows formally that risk-based capital requirements need to be adjusted to
reduce its pro-cyclicality. The capital requirement should be lowered when bank capital is
limited. Using the model, Repullo shows that a negative shock to aggregate supply of bank
capital should be accompanied by a reduction in the capital requirement. If the level of
capital requirement is maintained banks will be safer but it will lead to a disproportionate
reduction in economic activities. Therefore, it is optimal to lower the capital requirement
when the economy is in recession.
Repullo and Suarez (2013) also examine the impacts of capital requirements on
credit supply. However instead of looking at a negative shock of capital as an indicator of
the state of the economy, their paper focuses on ease with which banks can access equity
market. They show that if banks cannot access the capital market freely then there will be
variation in the supply of credit. This variation is larger under Basel II. The paper compares
the welfare under no capital requirements, Basel I, Basel II, and capital requirements that
maximizes the welfare. The results show that Basel II results in a more pro-cyclical banking
sector but it also reduces the probability of bank failure in recession and it has higher
welfare.
Risk-based capital standards, such as Basel I and Basel II, are believed to increase
the pro-cyclicality of the financial system according to theoretical models. While both
Basel accords are pro-cyclical, previous theoretical studies have placed more emphasized
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on examining the pro-cyclicality of Basel II. A paper that compares the pro-cyclicality
between Basel I and Basel II is Angelini et al. (2010). They examine to what degree procyclicality introduced by Basel II exceed that of Basel I and they found that the extra procyclicality due to Basel II is relatively small in their theoretical paper.
One important feature of bank capital is that most banks have a capital level that is
higher than the regulatory minimum. Some argue that this excess capital may dampen or
eliminate the pro-cyclicality of capital regulation on the lending pattern (Angelini, 2010).
However, Repullo and Suarez (2013) show formally that the equilibrium of the excess
capital is not sufficient to mitigate the impact of a recession on lending.
Although there are ample theoretical studies on pro-cyclicality, there are only a few
empirical studies in this area. In line with the previous literature outlined in the first two
sections, this paper examines the impact of Basel II on banking sector leverage using crosscountry data from 2005-2011.
4.3 Data
This study uses the assets and equity annual data from 2005-2011 at the individual
bank level. The individual bank data are drawn from Orbis database published by Bureau
van Dijk (BvD). Total assets and equity are collected from the database. Asset growth is
constructed by taking the log difference of assets between two periods. Leverage is defined
as the ratio of total asset to equity (Adrian and Shin, 2010).
In addition to the bank-level data, we include several country-level variables in the
regression. These variables are Basel II, GDP growth, and market liquidity. Basel II is
included to answer the question whether risk-based capital regulation affects leverage
growth. We include GDP growth and some measure of market liquidity when estimating
pro-cyclicality following Damar et.al (2013). Data for Basel II implementation are drawn
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from the Financial Stability Institute (FSI) survey and Bank Regulation and Supervision
Survey (BRSS). The FSI survey and BRSS are conducted by the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) and the World Bank respectively. The FSI July 2012 report contains
implementation dates of Basel II, 2.5 and III8 for 131 countries. Some missing data are
supplemented from the BRSS. In the regressions Basel is a dummy variable, which takes
on the value 1 if a country has implemented Basel II by a certain year and 0 otherwise.
Higher GDP growth rate will result in stronger pro-cyclicality as it reduces the cost
of rolling over short-term debt and therefore increases leverage growth (Damar et al, 2013).
GDP real growth data are obtained from the World Bank. Damar et al (2013) also argue
that if the market is more liquid it is easier for banks to adjust their leverage. Their empirical
findings confirm the positive association between leverage and liquidity. As a measure of
market liquidity, we use the ratio of liquid assets to deposit and short term funding. The
data are obtained from Global Financial Development Database (GFDD) 2013 from the
World Bank. Based on their definition, liquid assets include cash and due9 from banks,
trading securities and at fair value through income, loans and advances to banks, reverse
repos and cash collaterals. Deposits and short term funding includes total customer deposits
(current, savings and term10) and short term borrowing (money market instruments, CDs
and other deposits).

8

This study focuses on Basel II since we do not have the complete data on the implementation of
Basel 2.5 and III. Basel 2.5 was agreed in 2009 and was due to be implemented in 2011. Basel III
was introduced in 2010 and scheduled to be implemented in 2013 up through 2019.
9
Due from banks represents receivables from, or short-term loans to, other banks or financial
institutions.
10
Term deposit or time deposit is a deposit held at financial institutions over a fixed period of time.
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In line with the first essay, traditional and shadow banks are identified according to
the standard industrial classification (SIC) following Acharya et al. (2010). The
classification is based on the Office of Occupational Safety & Health Administration
(OSHA). OSHA categorizes finance, insurance, real estate under division H which is
identified as code 6000 through 6799. This broad division is divided into seven categories;
depository institutions (code 6011-6099), non-depository credit institutions (code 61116163), Security and Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, and Service (code 62116289), Insurance Carriers (code 6311-6399), Insurance Agents, Brokers, and Service
(6411), Real Estate (code 6512-6553), Holding and Other Investment Offices (code 67126799) (www.osha.gov). Based on the approach used by Adrian and Shin (2010) I define
shadow banks as those entities that fall under the category of non-depository credit
institutions (code 6111-6163), whereas I define the traditional banks to consist of
depository institutions (code 6011-6099).
Table 1 present some summary statistics for the entire sample of banks along with
country level data. There are total of 102,933 bank observations from 112 countries, which
cover the period from 2005 to 2011. The average of leverage growth and asset growth are
negative in our dataset. Table 1 combines both traditional and shadow bank observations.
TB is a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if the observation refers to a
traditional bank and 0 otherwise. The average of TB is 0.92, which implies that 92 percent
or 108,034 are traditional banks and the rest or 9,161 observations are shadow banks.
The country level data that are presented in Table 3 are for the year 2005 and 2011. In 2011
there are 111 countries in the dataset while in 2004 112 countries. GDP growth fluctuates
over the period of 2005 to 2011 and it reaches the lowest point in 2009 during the financial

87

crisis. Liquidity seems relatively stable over this period. In 2004 only one country had
implemented Basel II and by 2011 more than half of the countries in the dataset had
implemented it.
4.4 Empirical Model
There are two analyses in this essay. First, we examine the leverage pro-cyclicality
and second, we assess the effect of Basel using difference-in-difference approach. The
empirical model to estimate leverage pro-cyclicality is based on Adrian and Shin (2010),
Damar et al (2013), Card and Krueger (1994), and Card (1992). Adrian and Shin (2010)
regress leverage growth on asset growth to examine the pro-cyclicality in leverage. A
positive coefficient on asset growth indicates that leverage is pro-cyclical. Their model
only include bank-level data. Damar et al. (2013) incorporate both bank and country-level
data. We include both individual and country-level variable in our empirical models
following Damar et al. (2013).
To obtain the difference-in-differences effect of Basel II on leverage pro-cyclicality
we follow the modeling strategy of Card and Krueger (1994) and Card (1992). Card and
Krueger (1994) examine the effect of an increase in minimum wage on employment in fast
food restaurants. The minimum wage was raised in New Jersey on April 1992. They collect
the data on employment for two periods, before and after the minimum wage change, in
two states, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania did not increase the minimum
wage. Therefore, New Jersey serves as the treatment state and Pennsylvania as the control
state. They calculate a simple difference-in-difference using average employment and since
they only have two periods they fit the following regression.
(1)
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where

is the change in employment between the two periods,

of restaurant I, and

is a set characteristics

is a dummy variable and it equals 1 if the restaurant is in New

Jersey. The difference-in-differences can be estimated using regression (Angrist and
Pischke, 2009):
∗
where

(2)

is the employment at restaurant i in state s at time t.

and it equals 1 if the restaurant is in New Jersey.

is a dummy variable

is the time dummy, it equals 1 for

observations after the minimum wage change. The difference-in-difference is represented
by δ. Card (1992) shows that additional explanatory variables can be added into the
regression model (2) such as
∗
where

(3)

is the additional covariates for example individual characteristics of the workers

or state-level explanatory variables.
Instead of comparing two states as in Card and Krueger (1995), this study compares
two banking sectors, traditional and shadow. We also have the information before and after
Basel II implementation, for instance in 2011 almost 60 percent of countries in the sample
have implemented Basel II. Basel II is only applicable for the traditional banking sector,
therefore traditional banking sector will be the treatment and shadow banking sector is the
control. Then we can apply the difference-in-difference approach to evaluate the effect of
Basel on banking sector leverage.
The first model only includes a dummy indicating the banking sector and a dummy
for Basel implementation similar to equation 2.
∗
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(4)

where leverage growth is the log difference in leverage at bank i in sector s and period t.
Leverage is the ratio of total assets to equity. TB is a dummy variable for traditional banks,
which takes the value of 1 if traditional banks and 0 if shadow banks. Basel is a dummy
variable of Basel II implementation, it takes the value of 1 if a country has implemented
Basel II by a certain year and 0 otherwise. The estimator of δ is labeled as the differencein-differences (DD) estimator, in this case δ is DD estimates of the effects of traditional
banks that implemented Basel II.
The second model includes asset growth to examine the pro-cyclicality along with
several country-level variables as the additional covariates in the spirit of equation 3.
∗

(5)
where leverage growth is log difference in leverage of bank i in sector s and period t and
leverage is the ratio of total assets to equity. Asset growth is log difference in assets at bank
i in sector s and period t, market liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to deposit and short
term funding in sector s and period t, and GDP growth is annual growth of GDP in sector
s at time t.
The last model includes all interaction terms of asset growth, Basel, TB allowing
change in intercept and slope in estimating leverage pro-cyclicality. Following Adrian and
Shin (2010), coefficients of asset growth are the main interest, the larger the coefficient the
more pro-cyclical is leverage. To avoid bias estimates we use ln(leverage)t-2 instead of
ln(Leverage)t-1 since the left hand side variable is log difference in leverage.
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∗
∗
∗
∗

∗
∗
(6)

Using the estimation results from this equation we can compare the pro-cyclicality of
traditional and shadow banking (first row of Table 2). We also are able to see if Basel II
strengthens the pro-cyclicality in traditional banking sector (first column of Table 2). The
next section presents a discussion of some regression results using the empirical models.
4.5 Results
Table 3 present the regression results. The numbers in the parentheses are P-values.
The least square method is used to estimate equation 4, 5, and 6. Country and year dummies
are included in every regression except for the cross-section regressions, which only
include country dummies (Table 5). The dependent variables in all of the regressions are
leverage growth. We test Basel with all its interaction terms, TB and all its interaction
terms, and asset growth and all its interaction terms. The F-tests are all significant at least
at 5% level except for Basel and TB*Basel in column 2 of Table 3, which is only marginally
significant at the 10% level. Column 1 of Table 3 presents the estimation results using
equation 4. The column shows that only Basel coefficient is significant at 5% level. Basel
is a dummy variable, therefore it is interpreted as the differential effect of Basel between
banks in countries that implement Basel and banks in countries that do not implement
Basel. This coefficient suggests that banks in countries that have implemented Basel are
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associated with higher leverage growth of 1.7 percentage points relative to those in nonBasel country.
Column 2 of Table 3 presents the results from estimating equation 5. It includes
asset growth and country-level variables. All coefficients are significant except Basel and
GDP growth. The DD estimate, i.e. the interaction between Basel and TB, is significant at
10% level. The DD estimate reflects the differential effects of Basel on leverage growth in
traditional banks relative to shadow banks. The DD estimate suggests that Basel increases
leverage growth by 1.0468 percentage points for traditional banks relative to shadow
banks. The coefficient of asset growth is positive, suggesting that leverage is pro-cyclical.
A percent increase in asset growth is associated with 0.407 percent increase in leverage
growth. In contrast to Adrian and Shin’s (2010) findings, we find that the lag of the
logarithm of leverage is positive. An increase in lagged leverage of one percent, on average,
leads to about 8.381 percent increase in leverage growth. Market liquidity, which is
measured as the ratio of liquid assets to deposit and short term funding, has a positive effect
on leverage growth as expected. Higher market liquidity makes it easier for bank to
leverage up. On average, one percent increase in market liquidity leads to 0.0716 percent
increase in leverage growth.
The last column (column 3) of Table 3 shows the results from estimating equation
6. In this column all interaction terms of asset growth, Basel, and TB are included. The DD
estimate is positive and significant similar to the previous results. The coefficient suggests
that the effect of Basel II is 2.798 percentage point higher in traditional banks relative to
the shadow banks. These results allows us to compare the pro-cyclicality of traditional and
shadow banks and the effect of Basel on traditional banks. We are unable to examine the
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direct effect of Basel on shadow banks because only traditional banks are subject to Basel
II accord. Table 4 summarizes the comparisons.
In Table 4, TB=1 indicates traditional banks and TB=0 indicates shadow bank, B=1
indicates banks in countries that have implemented Basel II and B=0 refer to banks in
countries that have not implemented Basel II. From the second row of Table 4 we can
compare the coefficients of asset growth for traditional banks (0.3542) and for shadow
banks (0.5085). The coefficients of asset growth are positive suggesting that leverage is
pro-cyclical in the two banking sectors. However, the coefficient of asset for shadow banks
is 15.4 percentage points higher than for traditional banks and thus shadow banks are more
pro-cyclical. Column 1 of Table 4 allows us to compare leverage pro-cyclicality for
traditional banks that implement and those that do not implement Basel II. The coefficient
of asset growth is 0.4627 for traditional banks that implement Basel II and it is 0.3542 for
traditional banks that do not implement Basel II. These results suggest that traditional
banks that implement Basel II have a higher asset growth coefficient of 10.85 percentage
points and therefore Basel II induces more pro-cyclicality for traditional banks. This result
is in line with the findings in Kashyap and Stein (2004), Andersen (2011) and Egert and
Sutherland (2012). This findings suggest that there is room for improving the capital
regulation under the Basel Accord. One option is to modify the risk-weight as suggested
by Repullo (2013), the capital requirement should be reduced during downturn and raised
in the upturn.
Table 5 presents the regression results using cross-section data. This regression is
motivated by the economic growth literature, in which GDP growth is determined by the
initial condition (initial value of GDP or capital) and other explanatory variables (Barro
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and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). In our case, leverage growth is dependent of the initial value of
leverage, instead of lagged leverage as in the previous results (Table 3), and other control
variables including assets. The dependent variable is the average of leverage growth from
2005 to 2011. All of the independent variables are also averages over the same period and
the initial value of leverage is leverage in 2004. Column 1 of Table 5 displays the regression
result with TB and asset growth as the independent variable while column 2 includes the
initial value of leverage and macroeconomic variables in addition to TB and asset growth.
The results indicate that asset growth is positive in both regressions suggesting that
leverage is pro-cyclical. In this specification, GDP growth and liquidity are not statistically
different from zero while the initial level of leverage is positive and significant. This result
implies that banks with a higher level of leverage, have faster leverage growth. Therefore,
we find no evidence of absolute leverage convergence between low-level leveraged and
high-level leveraged banks.
4.6 Conclusions
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of Basel II implementation on
banks’ leverage growth. The analysis also allows us to calculate the difference-indifference effect of Basel. Traditional banks serve as the treatment group since Basel II is
only applied to this group and shadow banks serve as the control group. The results show
that Basel II increases banks’ leverage growth.
We have presented empirical evidence regarding leverage pro-cyclicality in
relation to implementation of Basel II for traditional and shadow banks using cross country
data. The results show that leverage is pro-cyclical across countries and in both banking
sectors. We examine further the level of pro-cyclicality for those sectors and found that the
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level of pro-cyclicality is higher in the shadow banking than in traditional banking sector.
These findings suggest that shadow banks are more active in managing their balance sheets.
They are more reactive to changing economic condition and adjust their balance sheets
accordingly.
Implementation of Basel II intensifies leverage pro-cyclicality in the traditional
banking sector. This stems from the fact that Basel II is a risk-weighted capital standard. It
requires more capital when economic conditions are poorer, exactly when bank capital
level is generally at the lowest point and this behavior exacerbates the downturn. This
mechanism works in the opposite direction too. Basel II requires less capital in good times
when banks have surplus capital. Therefore, banks find a way to employ the excess capital,
for instance, by lending more, which in turn strengthens the boom. One way to reduce the
pro-cyclicality is by adjusting the risk-weight capital requirement so that it requires less in
the recessions and requires more in the boom.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Variable

Unit

No. of
observation
(1)
(2)

Bank level
Leverage growth

Mean
(4)

Std.
Dev.
(5)

Min

Max

(6)

(7)

102,933

-0.004

0.24

-7.85

7.51

Asset growth

102,933

-0.08

0.24

-11.80

7.71

Ln(Leverage)-2

102,933

2.28

0.65

-0.32

10.48

Dummy traditional bank (TB)

102,933

0.28

0.27

0

1

0.56
0.54
5.20

0.50
0.50
3.00

0
0
-0.18

1
1
18.26

Country level
Basel 2005
Basel 2011
GDP growth 2005

Percent

113
113
111

GDP growth 2011

Percent

111

3.89

3.50

-10.48

15.00

Ratio of the liquid assets to
short- term funding and total
deposit 2005

Percent

111

36.33

17.37

1.62

81.02

Ratio of the liquid assets to
short- term funding and total
deposit 2011

Percent

111

33.16

20.07

6.68

133.78

This table presents summary statistics of variables that are used in the analysis. Leverage is the
ratio of total asset to equity and leverage growth is the annual growth of leverage. TB is a dummy
variable that takes a value of 1 if the bank is a traditional bank and 0 if it shadow bank. Basel is a
dummy variable that it takes a value of 1 if the country has implemented Basel and 0 otherwise.
Liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to deposit and short term funding. GDP growth is annual
growth of GDP.
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Table 4.2: Leverage Pro-cyclicality

TB=1
Coefficient of asset growth when B=1

TB=0
n.a.*

Coefficient of asset growth when B=0
*Note: Basel II is not applied for shadow banks
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Table 4.3: Regression Results of Leverage Growth on Asset Growth
Method: Least squares

TB
Basel
TB*Basel

1
Leverage Growth
-0.5587
(0.135)
1.7035
(0.027)**
0.0737
(0.908)

Asset growth

2
Leverage Growth
-1.617
(0.000)***
-0.7384
(0.293)
1.0468
(0.068)*
0.407
(0.000)***

Asset growth* Basel
TB*Asset growth
TB*Basel*Asset growth
Ln(Leverage)-2

5.3814
(0.000)***
0.0716
(0.000)***
0.0723
(0.141)
-6.0376
(0.341)
102,933
0.19
Yes
Yes

Liquidity
GDP growth
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Country dummy
Year dummy

2.4243
(0.729)
102,933
0.01
Yes
Yes

3
Leverage Growth
-3.3655
(0.000)***
-1.7002
(0.016)**
2.7982
(0.000)***
0.5085
(0.000)***
-0.0475
(0.001)***
-0.1543
(0.000)***
0.156
(0.000)***
5.3957
(0.000)***
0.0694
(0.000)***
0.0376
(0.443)
-5.4241
(0.391)
102,933
0.19
Yes
Yes

p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
This table presents regression results of leverage growth on capital regulation (Basel), assets, and
other bank-specific and macroeconomic variables. Leverage growth and asset growth are in
percent. The dependent variable is leverage growth 2005 to 2011. The independent variables that
are used are for the year 2005 and 2011. Leverage is the ratio of total asset to equity and leverage
growth is the annual growth of leverage. TB is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bank
is a traditional bank and 0 if it shadow bank. Basel is a dummy variable that it takes a value of 1 if
the country has implemented Basel and 0 otherwise. Liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to deposit
and short term funding. GDP growth is annual growth of GDP.
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Table 4.4: Leverage Pro-cyclicality: Results

(1) Coefficient of asset growth when B=1

(1)
TB=1
0.4627

(2) Coefficient of asset growth when B=0

0.3542
Basel II leads to more
pro-cyclicality
*Note: Basel II is not applied to shadow banks
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(2)
TB=0
n.a.*
0.5085

Shadow banks are
more pro-cyclical

Table 4.5: Regression Results of Leverage Growth on Asset Growth: Average
Method: Least squares

TB
Asset growth

1

2

Leverage Growth
(average 2005-2011)

Leverage Growth
(average 2005-2011)

0.3716
-0.301
0.4336
(0.000)***

-0.6987
(0.046)**
0.4124
(0.000)***
4.4381
(0.000)***
0.0078
(0.885)
0.5723
(0.144)
-5.5006
(0.413)
15,087
0.32
Yes

Initial Ln(Leverage)
Liquidity
GDP growth
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Country dummy

8.0682
-0.175
15,087
0.28
Yes

p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
This table presents regression results of leverage growth on capital regulation (Basel), assets, and
other bank-specific and macroeconomic variables. Leverage growth and asset growth are in
percent. The dependent variable is the average of leverage growth from 2005 to 2011. The
independent variables that are used are the average from 2005 to 2011. Leverage is the ratio of total
asset to equity and leverage growth is the annual growth of leverage. Initial leverage is leverage for
the year 2004. TB is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bank is a traditional bank and
0 if it shadow bank. Basel is a dummy variable that it takes a value of 1 if the country has
implemented Basel and 0 otherwise. Liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to deposit and short term
funding. GDP growth is annual growth of GDP.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Financial stability has been one of the main targets of central banks. At the
international level, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) shares this same
goal. As the standard setter for banking regulations, it has attempted to standardize capital
regulations globally to minimize the worldwide effects of financial disruptions. The
intention of the capital regulations proposed by the committee is to restrict banks from
taking excessive risks and to provide cushions to absorb losses in the event of negative
shocks adversely impacting a country’s banking system. It is then natural to ask: is capital
regulation effective in accomplishing its objectives?
The focus of this dissertation was to analyze the effectiveness of capital regulations
in relation to traditional and shadow banking entities. The shadow banking sector rose in
important in the past several decades. It grew rapidly and in some countries this sector has
surpassed the traditional sector in term of volumes of activities, possibly leading or
contributing to the 2007 financial crisis, as has been suggested by several studies. Thus,
better understanding of the shadow banking sector and its interactions with the traditional
banking sector will help us understand how to improve the system in order to obtain overall
financial sector stability. This dissertation, thus, examines how capital regulations
influence the relative size of shadow banking sector, the risk-taking behavior of the two
sectors, and how they influence the cyclicality of those sectors.
The first essay analyses how minimum capital requirements affect the shadow
banking sector. The share of shadow to total traditional and shadow banking assets is used
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to measure shadow banking growth. Previous literature has argued that increased
regulation of the traditional banking sector will lead to regulatory arbitrage and increase in
shadow banking activities. The shadow banking sector is relatively less regulated than its
traditional counterpart. The restrictions in the traditional banking sector will encourage
banks to shift their operation away to the shadow banking sector. This hypothesis is tested
using data from 76 countries over the 2005 through 2010 period. Hausman-Taylor
approach is utilized to analyze the impact of minimum capital requirements on the share of
shadow banking assets. This approach is appropriate because it can accommodate
corrections for the endogeneity of the minimum capital requirements and it allows us to
account for the effect of time-invariant covariates. The results provide some evidence in
favor of the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis, particularly in high-income countries.
The result is as expected, minimum capital requirements increase the share of
shadow banking activities in the high-income countries. More advanced economies tend to
have larger shadow banking sector, which may be because the sector requires more
complex financial systems and better technology to develop. Therefore, minimum capital
requirements have bigger impacts in advanced economies, increasing shadow banking
activities in these countries. The policy implication of this finding is apparent, capital
regulations should not be made uniform and inflexible. To be effective the regulation
should accommodate variations in countries’ characteristics.
The second essay analyzes bank risk-taking behavior when the capital requirement
is strengthened. Two risk measures are used, the share of non-performing loans to total
loans in the bank’s portfolio as a measure of ex-post risk and bank z-score as a measure of
ex-ante risk. This essay is motivated by the diverse arguments on the effectiveness of
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capital regulations. Those regulations are proxied by implementation of Basel II, with its
intent to reduce risks. The sample contains data from 82 countries over the 2005 through
2012 period. Basel II may be endogenous, therefore an instrumental variable approach is
used to assess risk-taking behavior. The instrument for Basel II is a country’s z-score or
the probability of default of a country's banking system. The results show that Basel II is
effective in reducing both ex-post and ex-ante risks. The shadow banking sector is found
to take on higher ex-ante risk while the traditional banking sector tend to take on higher
ex-post risks. Thus, the findings support the argument that Basel II limits bank risk-taking
behavior.
The third essay assesses the level of pro-cyclicality of traditional and shadow
banking sectors using the relationship between leverage and assets. It further considers the
effect of Basel II implementation on leverage growth. It has been argued that Basel II,
which is a risk-weighted capital regulation, is pro-cyclical. It requires more capital when
the economy is in recession, which then leads to lower lending, which aggravates the
downturn. By the same mechanism, it intensifies the upturn. Pro-cyclicality is observed by
measuring a positive relationship between asset growth and leverage growth.

The

implication of pro-cyclicality is that it exacerbates overall economic fluctuations. The
sample of 111 countries are pooled over the period of 2005-2011. The results indicate that
the traditional banking sector tends to be less pro-cyclical than the shadow banking sector.
Basel II implementation is found to intensify the pro-cyclicality in both sectors. This essay
leaves the discussion on how to reduce pro-cyclicality, especially in the shadow banking
sector is an important topic that will need to be tacked in the future.
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This dissertation sheds some light on the effects of capital regulations imposed on
the traditional and shadow banking sector. The results from the second and third essay
indicate that capital regulation is effective in reducing bank-risk taking, however it leads
to more pro-cyclicality. Despite its effectiveness, capital regulations also brings unintended
consequences by worsening the business cycle. Thus, we may need other mechanisms or
regulations to deal with the pro-cyclicality that capital regulations impart on the banking
sector.
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